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I. INTRODUCTION
Legislators and prosecutors often argue that broad, expansive
white-collar statutes are necessary given the creativity and
expertise of corporate offenders.1 The Supreme Court, however, has
often been unsympathetic as it has frequently raised concerns that
federal white-collar statutes are overly broad and vague.2 In
McDonnell v. United States, for example, the Supreme Court
overturned the criminal bribery conviction of a state governor who
had accepted expensive cars in exchange for setting up a meeting.3
The Court recognized both overbreadth and vagueness concerns.4 It
rejected the Government’s broad interpretation of federal antibribery statutes, questioning whether Congress truly intended to
punish a public official who received a free lunch in exchange for
meeting with a constituent.5 It also highlighted the “vagueness
shoal” motivating its decision: the statute was not sufficiently
precise to put public officials on fair notice about acceptable
behavior.6 While the statute was not so vague as to be
unconstitutional, the Court believed that Congress did not speak
1 See Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 520 (2011) (“If one
attempts to key one's definition of fraud to descriptions of behaviors, new behaviors will
inevitably be invented, or will simply arise, that expose the definition as faulty and
underinclusive.”); Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT.
REV. 345, 409-12 (discussing the use of statutory vagueness to deter loopholing); Robert A.
Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, and the Supreme Court, 45 AM. BUS. L.J.
611, 676 (2008) (noting that courts and legislatures create broad fraud laws to encompass
novel fraudulent conduct); Jack Talbot, Liability for Unintentional Misrepresentation in
Arkansas, 49 ARK. L. REV. 525, 555 (1996) (“[A] loose definition is required because the law
needs enough flexibility to encompass the variety of crooked enterprises designed by
intentional fraud-feasors.”).
2 See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408 (2010) (declining to broaden scope
of honest services fraud because “[r]eading the statute to proscribe a wider range of offense
conduct . . . would raise the due process concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine”); United
States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1999) (discussing the
reluctance to adopt a broad interpretation of a statute governing the acceptance of gifts by a
public official); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (expressing concern that
federal anti-corruption doctrine leaves “its outer boundaries ambiguous”).
3 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2367–68 (2016) (rejecting a broad
interpretation of the term “official act” to include setting up a meeting).
4 See id. (stating that constitutional concerns caused the Court to adopt a more narrow
reading of the federal bribery statute).
5 See id. at 2372 (questioning whether Congress intended to count a lunch as quid in a
quid pro quo exchange).
6 Id. at 2373 (citing Skilling, 561 U.S. at 402–03).
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sufficiently clearly so as to prohibit such an exchange.7 The Court
narrowed the scope of federal bribery, holding that Congress did not
prohibit payment of public officials for simple meetings.8
Overbreadth and vagueness, however, are not coextensive
concerns. While closely related, overbreadth and vagueness address
distinct interests. A narrowing decision addresses the overbreadth
problem, and this is a victory for the immediate defendant. Proof of
liability becomes more difficult. Not all parties similarly situated to
the defendant, however, may appreciate a narrower scope of
liability. In McDonnell, the governor was pleased to have his
conviction overturned. For public officials in general, however, it is
unclear whether they all would prefer a world in which they could
accept expensive cars in exchange for setting up meetings.9 Public
officials who represent poorer districts might resent such a rule
because they have few constituents who have the capacity to offer
large payments. Other officials might personally find such
payments immoral and dislike the idea that federal law does not
criminalize those payments.
In contrast, there is a common interest in clarity; individuals and
companies want to know precisely what activity might subject them
to liability. Reduced breadth may be helpful to particular
companies, but it is possible that some companies simply prefer a
level playing field in which everyone understands the clear rules. It
is likely that public officials widely benefit from the improved clarity
of the McDonnell holding. They now know the bright-line rule. Thus
to the extent they consider accepting any payment or gift in

7 Id. at 2375 (avoiding invalidating the statute by narrowing construing “official act” to
avoid vagueness concerns).
8 Id. at 2372 (noting that the vague statute would raise constitutional concerns by causing
public officials to hesitate when responding to even “commonplace requests for assistance”
and to citizens seeking to participate in our democratic process).
9 See, e.g., Brief of the Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. School of Law as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent at*2, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474), 2016 WL
1388255, at *2 (arguing that what the “democracy [petitioners] have in mind is not one that
those who adopted the First Amendment would recognize”); Brief of Amicus Curiae Citizens
for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington in Support of Respondent at *3, McDonnell, 136
S. Ct. 2355 (No. 15-474), 2016 WL 1445327, at *3 (“The scope of prohibited conduct does not
impinge on an official’s ability to engage properly with the public.”); Brief of Amici Curiae
Public Citizen, Inc., and Democracy 21 in Support of Respondent at *3, McDonnell, 136 S. Ct.
2355 (No. 15-474), 2016 WL 1445328, at *3 (arguing that politicians trading responsiveness
for personal gain is not accepted).
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exchange for a meeting, they can safely make the decision knowing
that there is no threat of federal criminal liability.
The Supreme Court’s narrowing decision in McDonnell is a
frequent response to these vagueness and overbreadth concerns for
white-collar statutes. The decision reduces the breadth of the
prohibited behavior: elected officials may not accept bribes in
exchange for official acts, but solely setting up a meeting does not
constitute an official act.10 This narrowing decision fortunately also
reduces vagueness.11 Elected officials have a bright-line rule,
knowing that they can confidently accept payment in exchange for
a meeting. Public officials can thus make decisions regarding
accepting a payment or gift in exchange for a meeting with greater
certainty regarding the consequences.
There are a variety of narrowing strategies that courts can apply,
however, and not all narrowing strategies result in reduced
vagueness. In this article, I explore the range of narrowing
strategies and their impact on the vagueness shoal. Some strategies
may increase vagueness because they introduce a complex or
unclear element of analysis. Other strategies increase vagueness
because they introduce an element that has an unclear relationship
with other existing elements of analysis. Even if the new element is
not vague, the interaction with existing elements may exacerbate
vagueness. The unpredictable situation may lead both to greater
vagueness and potentially broader liability. I highlight the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United
States ex rel. Escobar attempting to narrow the scope of civil liability
under the False Claims Act as an example of a strategy that
exacerbates vagueness both through the complexity of the new
element and the relationship of the element to the existing
analysis.12
The Supreme Court’s general strategy of narrowing liability in
the face of vagueness as to the scope of white-collar offenses has
often been sound, but it is vital that the Court not lose sight of the
10 See McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2368 (“[S]etting up a meeting . . . does not, standing alone,
qualify as an official act.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
11 See id. at 2375 (stating that the Court’s interpretation of “official act” avoids vagueness
concerns).
12 See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2003
(2016) (stating that the False Claims Act is not a “vehicle for punishing garden-variety
breaches of contract or regulatory violations”).
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broader interests in clarity. Failing to address the vagueness
concerns hinders the ability of corporations to comply with the law.
Furthermore, the vagueness problems may also hinder the dialectic
with Congress in improving these laws. In Part II, I compare the
principles of vagueness and overbreadth, particularly as they apply
to white-collar statutes. In Part III, I consider the spectrum of
narrowing strategies. Part IV evaluates the Supreme Court’s
decision in Escobar, and I conclude in Part V.
II. VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH IN WHITE-COLLAR STATUTES
A. VAGUENESS

Vagueness is the antithesis of clarity, and the “vagueness shoal”
described by the Supreme Court encompasses a variety of doctrines
and concerns.13 The most immediate legal doctrine concerning
vagueness is void-for-vagueness: a “statute must clearly define the
conduct it proscribes.”14 Courts may refuse to enforce imprecise
statutes based on principles related to the Due Process Clause.15
Vagueness concerns do not necessarily require invalidation of a
statute, though.16 The rule of lenity reflects this same vagueness
concern, requiring that “ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”17
The main principle underlying vagueness is fair notice: a person
is entitled to fair notice of what is prohibited.18 It seems unfair that
a person should be punished if the statute was insufficiently clear

13 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2373 (citing Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402–03
(2010)).
14 Skilling, 561 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J. concurring) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
15 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1137, 1140 (2016)
(stating that vague statutes violate the Due Process Clause and that the Supreme Court has
often invalidated such statutes).
16 See, e.g., McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2375 (determining that the federal bribery statute
should not be invalidated but instead narrowed to mitigate the vagueness concerns).
17 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S.
808, 812 (1971)).
18 See United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008) (“[A] conviction fails to comport
with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited.”); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453
(1939) (asserting that nobody should be required to speculate about the meaning of a statute).
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about the proscribed behavior.19 Another is the concern that a
statute “is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously
discriminatory enforcement.”20 This second concern recognizes the
risk of excessive discretion in the hands of law enforcement.21 A
third, potentially related, concern is that the vagueness may be an
improper delegation of legislative power.22
Vagueness usually concerns the scope of prohibited conduct.23
Vagueness issues may also arise regarding the scope of parties
subject to the statute.24 Vagueness may also encompass the severity
of punishment; the public should also be on notice as to the potential
sanctions facing such conduct.25 Vagueness challenges have also
been used in non-criminal contexts.26
We can see the Court’s concern regarding vagueness in Smith v.
Goguen.27 In Goguen, a man was prosecuted for wearing jeans that
contained a U.S. flag because he “did publicly treat contemptuously
the flag of the United States.”28 The Supreme Court struck down the
conviction on void for vagueness grounds.29 It recognized that
19 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972) (stating that vague laws
are unfair because such laws “may trap the innocent” and allow for inequitable enforcement);
Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 (“[A] fair warning should be given to the world in language that the
common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To
make the warning fair, so fair as possible the line should be clear.” (quoting McBoyle v. United
States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)).
20 Williams, 553 U.S. at 304.
21 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983) (discussing the expansive discretion
that broadly drafted statutes provide to law enforcement).
22 See Hessick, supra note 15, at 1143–44 (discussing cases where the Court found vague
laws to cause delegation problems, and the relationship between delegation and discretion).
23 See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 415 (2010) (“A criminal statute must clearly
define the conduct it proscribes.” (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108)).
24 See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 454–55 (1939) (addressing prohibition of gang
membership).
25 See Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2554 (2015) (holding that increased
sentences under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause are unconstitutional);
United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1948) (upholding dismissal of an offense due
to ambiguity in statutory punishment); cf. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 121–22
(1979) (holding that the statutory scheme not void for vagueness even though different
statutes with different penalties addressed same behavior).
26 See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 491 (1982)
(considering vagueness challenge against business license ordinance); Giaccio v.
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966) (allowing vagueness challenge regardless of statute’s
penal or civil nature).
27 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
28 Id. at 570.
29 Id. at 567–68.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

7

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 [2019], Art. 3

502

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:495

“casual treatment of the flag in many contexts has become a
widespread contemporary phenomenon . . . . It and many other
current, careless uses of the flag nevertheless constitute
unceremonial treatment that many people may view as
contemptuous.”30 Thus, the statute
fails to draw reasonably clear lines between the kinds
of nonceremonial treatment that are criminal and those
that are not. Due process requires that all ‘be informed
as to what the State commands or forbids,’ and that
‘men of common intelligence’ not be forced to guess at
the meaning of the criminal law.31
Some Supreme Court decisions have suggested that the
standards for vagueness vary depending on circumstances.32 For
example, statutes governing military behavior may be subject to
less stringent vagueness analysis in comparison with statutes
governing civilian society.33 The presence of criminal penalties, in
comparison with civil sanctions, may also call for a higher standard
of certainty.34
While the precise contours of the doctrine are debated,35 the
interests of defendants and society can be summarized through
these “vagueness principles,” which I label as clarity. Other
synonyms would be predictability and certainty.36 Potential
defendants have an immediate interest in clearly understanding the
limits of acceptable behavior and the attendant consequences.
These consequences include both civil and criminal sanctions.

Id. at 574.
Id. (quoting Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1938)).
32 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983) (noting that the standard for
vagueness is higher where the law could touch a large amount of constitutionally protected
conduct or imposes criminal penalties).
33 Id. (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974)).
34 See id. (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); Colautti v. Franklin, 439
U.S. 379, 394–401 (1979); Lanzetta, 306 U.S. at 458) (noting that the court has invalidated
criminal statutes on their face even when they could have had valid applications).
35 See Kahan, supra note 1, at 346 (describing lenity enforcement as “notoriously sporadic
and unpredictable”).
36 See Gregory C. Keating, Fidelity to Pre-Existing Law and the Legitimacy of Legal
Decision, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (1993) (noting that individuals can plan their life in
accordance with legal obligations if they are certain and predictable).
30
31
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B. OVERLY BROAD STATUTES

Overbreadth is a concern related to vagueness.37 The normative
concern is that a particular statute prohibits too broad a swath of
behavior.38 I refer to this generally as the overbreadth problem.
A statute may be overly broad for various reasons. One version
of this problem can be found in overbreadth doctrine; a statute may
be too broad and thus improperly infringe on an individual’s First
Amendment rights.39 For example, the Supreme Court overturned
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 on overbreadth
grounds, noting that the statute appeared to punish protected
speech that may have literary or artistic value.40 The First
Amendment is not the only overbreadth concern, though. Others
have argued that laws may be overly broad because enforcement of
the law violates cost-benefit analysis.41 Overbreadth concerns are
also often raised under the overcriminalization umbrella.42 As a
general matter, the problem of overly broad statutes may relate to
a variety of rights or interests.43 Neither do I limit the overbreadth

37 See William Trosch, The Third Generation of Loitering Laws Goes to Court: Do Laws
that Criminalize “Loitering with the Intent to Sell Drugs” Pass Constitutional Muster?, 71
N.C. L. REV. 513, 545 (1993) (“The vagueness doctrine, at least in part, is closely related to
the overbreadth doctrine.”).
38 See e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (“According to our First
Amendment overbreadth doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial
amount of protected speech.”)
39 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853
(1991).
40 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 246 (2002) (“The CPPA prohibits speech
despite its serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”).
41 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Defining Overcriminalization Through Cost-Benefit
Analysis: The Example of Criminal Copyright Laws, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 783, 785 (2005)
(suggesting that “a law overcriminalizes when the costs of treating conduct as a crime exceed
the benefits of the new criminal law”).
42 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 507 (2001) (noting that criminal law’s breadth is well documented); Paul J. Larkin, Jr.,
Regulation, Prohibition, and Overcriminalization: The Proper and Improper Uses of the
Criminal Law, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 745, 745 (2014) (arguing that overcriminalization targets
conduct that is morally blameless); Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 7
AM. CRIM. L. Q. 17, 19–27 (1968) (discussing examples of improperly criminalized private
morality such as adultery, prostitution, gambling, and narcotics).
43 See Kadish, supra note 42 (noting a variety of interests that are overly criminalized).
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problem to criminal matters; civil sanctions may similarly be overly
broad in coverage.44
Because of the normative nature of an overbreadth argument,
the strength of the countervailing interest is often weighed against
the sanction.45 For example, courts applying overbreadth doctrine
focus on the importance of the speech at play.46 Some forms of
speech, such as obscenity, may not receive any value, and thus
overbreadth has little bite.47 Moving up the scale, commercial
speech receives some protection, but perhaps less than
noncommercial speech.48 These interests are weighed against the
sanction applied. Courts recognize that comparatively stronger
sanctions require greater judicial scrutiny.49
C. COMPARING VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH

Overbreadth and vagueness are distinct but related concerns. A
statute might be vague but not overly broad. A statute might be
vague in that it does not sufficiently put defendants on fair notice,
but it is possible that the entire range of potentially prohibited
behavior is undesirable and worthy of the relevant sanction.
In United States v. Williams, the defendant raised both
overbreadth and vagueness defenses against the criminalization of
child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A.50 The Court first
analyzed whether 18 U.S.C. § 2252A was overly broad.51 It rejected
the idea that the statute covered mainstream Hollywood movies
44 See, e.g., Joan H. Krause, Skilling and the Pursuit of Healthcare Fraud, 66 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 363, 370–71 (2012) (discussing the broad scope of the Anti-Kickback Statute in
healthcare which can be enforced through civil penalties and other administrative sanctions).
45 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 292 (2008) (“On the one hand, the
threat of enforcement of an overbroad law deters people from engaging in constitutionally
protected speech . . . . On the other hand, invalidating a law that in some of its applications
is perfectly constitutional . . . has obvious harmful effects.”).
46 Id.
47 See e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“This much has been categorically
settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment.”).
48 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983) (citing Vill. of Hoffman Estates v.
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S., 489, 499 (1948)) (noting that regulation of “business
behavior” is subject to less scrutiny because the subject matter is narrower).
49 See id. (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948) (“[W]here a statute imposes
criminal penalties, the standard of certainty is higher.”)).
50 Williams, 553 U.S. at 288. The relevant statute is known as the Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT).
51 Id. at 292–304.
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that portrayed simulated sexual activity.52 It next analyzed whether
the statute was void for vagueness under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.53 It concluded that the statute was not so
vague as to require facial invalidation, as its requirements of mens
rea were as clear as the requirement for the crimes of fraud,
conspiracy, or solicitation.54
Similarly, the defendant in Goguen raised both vagueness and
overbreadth concerns.55 Goguen was decided on vagueness grounds
and the Court’s majority did not rule on the overbreadth
argument.56 Nonetheless, Justice White in concurrence and Justices
Rehnquist and Blackmun in dissent discussed whether the
defendant’s behavior actually contained expressive value and was
thus entitled to protection under the First Amendment.57 It is
possible that there was no First Amendment protection for the
ability to sew the American Flag onto a pair of jeans, and thus the
statute was not overbroad. Nonetheless, the statute must still be
sufficiently clear to put people on notice as to what behavior
constitutes a violation.
Conversely, an overly broad statute does not have to be vague. A
statute may be clear and specific as to the actions it prohibits, but
the statute may still impinge on important rights and actions. For
example, a criminal statute might clearly prohibit any involvement
with prostitution, but there may be a variety of normative reasons
why prostitutes should not be subject to criminal prosecution.58
Thus, an overly broad statute does not necessarily trigger the same
fair notice concerns as a vague statute.

Id. at 301–02.
Id. at 304–07.
54 Id. at 306–07.
55 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 568 (1974).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 591–92 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (examining whether the penalty was actually
for harming the structural integrity of the flag).
58 See, e.g., Kadish, supra note 42, at 19–27 (discussing examples of improperly
criminalized private morality such as adultery, prostitution, gambling, and narcotics).
52
53
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Figure 1: Overbreadth vs. Vagueness
Not overbroad
Overbroad
Not vague
U.S. v. Williams
Prostitution,
(PROTECT)
Ashcroft v. Free
Speech (CPPA)
Vague
Smith v. Goguen
McDonnell v. U.S.
While overbreadth and vagueness are conceptually distinct,
courts recognize the close relationship between the principles and
doctrines.59 Courts often acknowledge both vagueness and
overbreadth concerns in a statutory scheme.60 The Supreme Court
has applied relatively high levels of scrutiny for vagueness
arguments in First Amendment cases, thus mirroring overbreadth
doctrinal concerns.61 The vagueness of a particular statute may
result in an overly broad interpretation.62 Similarly, a court may be
concerned about an overly broad statute and frame its concern as
vagueness, because it feels the boundaries of the statute should be
clearer. Prosecutors may make an overly broad interpretation of the
statute, and the threat of criminal sanctions may prevent
defendants from taking action that Congress did not intend to
prohibit.63 Both overbreadth and vagueness can create the same
opportunities for excessive discretion in law enforcement.64

59 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 371 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority as “confound[ing] vagueness and overbreadth”).
60 See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 491
(1982) (challenging an ordinance as “unconstitutionally vague and overbroad”); United States
v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 288 (2008) (analyzing a statute for both overbreadth and vagueness
concerns).
61 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (requiring a compelling state
interest in order for a state to justify regulating “limited First Amendment freedoms”); 1
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 2.3 (3d ed.) (stating that “due process . . .
require[s] that a criminal statute be declared void when it is so vague that ‘men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application’”).
62 See Jordan v. Pugh, 425 F. 3d 820, 828 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Overbreadth and vagueness
may overlap when the challenged statute is so unclear in its scope that officials enforce it in
an overbroad manner.”).
63 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 630 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that “overbreadth review is a necessary means of preventing a ‘chilling effect’ on
protected expression”).
64 See id. at 613 (addressing overbreadth claims “where such conduct has required official
approval under laws that delegated standardless discretionary power to local functionaries”)
(citing Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
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As Professor Hessick has noted, analysis of vagueness or
overbreadth concerns should not be limited to a single statute.65
Non-vague statutes may trigger the underlying problems of
vagueness through overbreadth.66 Clear statutes may have
overlapping coverage, which creates uncertainty for individuals
whose behavior is covered by multiple statutes with different
penalty regimes.67 Analyzing a single statute in isolation may not
reveal overbreadth or vagueness problems, but courts should
consider the entire statutory and enforcement scheme. A single
statute may be clear and independently desirable, but the existence
of other statutes covering the same behavior might render the first
statute overly broad. A potential defendant thus also faces the
underlying problem of vagueness; it is uncertain as to the relevant
sanction given the overlapping statutory regime.68
Overbreadth and vagueness are thus tightly intertwined
concepts. For this article’s purposes, however, I emphasize the
distinctions between overbreadth and vagueness. The lack of clarity
in vagueness creates uncertainty and the potential lack of notice for
defendants. Overbreadth instead is a normative concern that a
statute ensnares too wide a variety of behavior, some of which may
not merit the relevant statutory sanctions.
D. IMPORTANCE IN WHITE-COLLAR OFFENSES

The vagueness and overbreadth concerns have particular
salience in the white-collar context. First, the enforcement regimes
governing white-collar offenses tend to raise vagueness and
overbreadth concerns. The expansive, interconnected state of
criminal, civil, and administrative law governing corporate
behavior raises many opportunities for overlapping and potentially
553–558 (1965); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938)).
65 See Hessick, supra note 15, at 1145–51 (noting that as criminal codes have expanded,
vagueness concerns have increased).
66 See id (“[T]he enforcement of non-vague laws can result in a lack of notice, lead to
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and represent an unwarranted delegation.”).
67 See id. at 1147 (describing how the expansion of criminal codes has resulted in statutes
that overlap with existing crimes).
68 See id. at 1147–49 (describing how the newly enacted criminal codes give different
sanctions for the same conduct, which results in broad prosecutorial discretion when deciding
between different punishments).
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conflicting sanctions.69 Legislators and prosecutors often argue that
broad, vague statutes are necessary given the creativity and
expertise of white-collar offenders.70 Second, the presence of
sophisticated corporate entities highlights the importance of
resolving the vagueness concerns in contrast with overbreadth
concerns.71
1. Prevalence of vagueness and overbreadth concerns.
Judicial concerns of vagueness and overbreadth are common in
the white-collar context for a variety of reasons. First is the
perceived need for broad, general statutes in confronting fraud.72
Fraud requires deception, and criminals thus require novel ways of
deceiving victims.73 The legislative process may be slow to keep up
with new schemes.74 Changes in commercial activity and
development of new technologies force courts to consider the legality
of novel economic practices.75 The diversity of beliefs in the U.S.
business and political realms requires development of clear
guidance regarding appropriate limits.76 Even if those broad
criminal statutes are intended to be temporary measures, courts
69 See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr, Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization, 36 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 715, 751 (2013) (“Like a vague law, a surfeit of laws makes it difficult to
know what is and what is not outlawed.”); see also Stuntz, supra note 42, at 586 (explaining
how the expansion of criminal codes has resulted in arbitrary guidelines in which “morally
similar cases yield very different sentences”).
70 See Kahan, supra note 1, at 409–12 (discussing the use of statutory vagueness to deter
loopholing).
71 See infra Part II.D.2.
72 See Samuel W. Buell, What Is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 520 (2011) (stating
that “the social realities of fraud . . . exert great pressure on legal regimes to address fraud
with open-textured rules that are vulnerable to complaints of intolerable vagueness”).
73 See Jack Talbot, Liability for Unintentional Misrepresentation in Arkansas, 49 ARK. L.
REV. 525, 555 (1996) (“[A] loose definition [of fraud] is required because the law needs enough
flexibility to encompass the variety of crooked enterprises designed by intentional fraudfeasors.”).
74 See United States v. Turner, 465 F.3d 667, 674 (6th Cir. 2006) (describing theory of
honest services fraud as a “stopgap” and “temporary fix” (citing 135 CONG. REC. S1025-02,
(daily ed. Feb. 2, 1989) (statement of Sen. Biden))).
75 See Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, Securities Fraud Litigation, and the Supreme Court,
45 AM. BUS. L.J. 611, 676 (2008) (stating that courts have created flexibility in fraud law to
confront novel economic practices).
76 See Harvey A. Silverglate & Emma Quinn-Judge, Tawdry or Corrupt? McDonnell Fails
to Draw A Clear Line for Federal Prosecution of State Officials, 2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 189,
213 (2015) (arguing that the lack of standards results in different theories of liability that are
both vague and inconsistently applied).
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express concern when prosecutors continue to use those same
criminal statutes even after Congress passes more specific
legislation.77
Another consideration is that the vague nature of white-collar
statutes may be a product of structural contradictions in the
legislative process.78 In contrast to the first argument, this
structural concern suggests that Congress is not fully committed to
limiting white-collar offenses. According to this theory, Congress
must reconcile fundamentally competing structural forces, such as
the benefits of economic productivity from unregulated labor
contrasted against the political pressures of workers’ interest
groups.79 These structural conflicts constrain Congress’s ability to
produce effective law, resulting in vague and potentially ineffective
laws.80
A third factor leading to overbreadth and vagueness concerns is
the scope and depth of the modern administrative state.81 Beyond
the simple growth of federal criminal laws, businesses are subject
to a wide variety of civil and administrative regulations. This is
evident in the U.S. healthcare industry, as courts seek to
understand the complex relationship between regulatory violations
and civil or criminal offenses.82 If a corporate entity knows it is
violating a regulation, does its claim to be a law-abiding entity
constitute fraud?

77 See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405–06 (1974) (Burger, J., dissenting) (noting
that the mail fraud statute should only be temporarily utilized for any “new” fraud that
develops).
78 See Kitty Calavita, Employer Sanctions Violations: Toward A Dialectical Model of
White-Collar Crime, 24 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 1041, 1046 (1990) (conveying that lawmakers have
been able to circumvent the structural contradictions they face).
79 See KITTY CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE CONTROL OF LABOR, 1820-1924
7–8 (Z. Bankowski et al. eds., 1984) (explaining that under a structuralist theory, a state
must promote political stability as well as resolve inherent conflicts in order to ensure the
success of their economic system).
80 See Calavita, supra note 78, at 1046 (describing the process by which white-collar law
is rendered “symbolic”).
81 See Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate and White Collar Crime: Simplifying the Ambiguous, 31
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 392 (1994) (linking growth of federal offenses and corporate criminal
liability as sources of ambiguity in the white-collar context).
82 Compare United States ex rel. Hobbs v. MedQuest Assocs., Inc., 711 F.3d 707, 719 (6th
Cir. 2013) (finding no FCA liability for improperly identified supervising physician), with
United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 829 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding FCA liability for
improperly identified physician provider).
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In confronting the combination of broad statutes and overlapping
regulatory schemes, courts fundamentally encounter a sorting
problem.83 A single wrongful act may constitute a variety of
offenses.84 At times, courts express significant uncertainty due to a
lack of common agreement as to the harms and governing social
norms.85
For some white-collar offenses, measuring harm is relatively
straightforward. A huckster may sell sham investments to a victim,
and the victims can measure their monetary losses. If those sold
investments are entirely worthless, a huckster who has illicitly
obtained $100 million has caused more harm than a huckster who
illicitly obtained $20,000. The $100 million huckster seems
deserving of greater punishment in comparison to the $20,000
huckster.
Other white-collar offenses are more difficult, though. For
example, if a company lies about its contractually-required small
business status but otherwise delivers a legitimate product, what is
the harm from such a fraud?86 What if a government official receives
the use of a Ferrari in exchange for attending a luncheon?87 When
the harm is difficult to ascertain, courts face challenges in
determining whether the offense is properly treated as deserving
punishment.88

83 See Miriam Baer, Sorting White Collar Crime, 97 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019)
(arguing that ungraded white-collar statutory schemes make it difficult to determine the
severity of a specific offense).
84 See
Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal
Prosecutorial Power and the Need for A Law of Counts, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1107, 1120
(2005) (stating that the breadth and variety of the federal criminal code makes it “likely that
a defendant’s behavior will potentially violate a multitude of overlapping criminal statutes,
especially where white-collar crime is involved”); see also Julie Rose O'Sullivan, The Federal
Criminal "Code": Return of Overfederalization, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 57, 60 (2014)
(describing how prosecutors must pick and choose which statutes to enforce because of the
overlapping federal criminal code).
85 See, e.g., United States v. Weimert, 819 F.3d 351, 358 (7th Cir. 2016) (expressing
uncertainty as to propriety of criminal sanction for deception in the course of negotiation).
86 See Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994), aff'd, 57 F.3d
1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (declining to grant damages because the Government could not
demonstrate harm from Ab-Tech’s falsehood).
87 McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2363–65 (2016).
88 See Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social Meaning, 97
CAL. L. REV. 1515, 1559, 1563 (2009) (proposing limits to fraud liability linked to
measurement of harm).
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In the criminal context, courts are concerned about
disproportionate punishment. While not necessarily rising to the
level of an Eighth Amendment challenge, courts are suspicious
about legislative intent and the proper scope of coverage for an
offense. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1014 punishes bank fraud with up
to 30 years in prison and/or a fine of up to one million dollars.89
Despite 18 U.S.C. § 1014’s broad definition of fraud, Justice Stevens
expressed doubt that Congress truly intended to punish minor lies
with such a strong penalty.90 Taken on its face, the statute’s
prohibition of false statements for the purpose of influencing a bank
officer could technically include “false explanations for arriving late
at a meeting, false assurances that an applicant does not mind if the
loan officer lights up a cigar, false expressions of enthusiasm about
the results of a football game or an election, as well as false
compliments about the subject of a family photograph.”91 This
uncertainty regarding Congressional intent creates the possibility
of vagueness and overbreadth concerns.92
The uncertainty in harm also generates problems with civil
actions, because courts are concerned that the civil sanctions are
actually punitive in nature and thus deserving of greater scrutiny.93
Without clear measures of relative harm, however, how does a court
determine whether a particular monetary sanction is punitive or
compensatory?94 Even if a particular statute were sufficiently clear
and narrow to satisfy a civil standard, the potential for punitive
application may lead a court to recognize an overbreadth or
vagueness challenge. Courts recognize that comparatively stronger
sanctions require greater protections for defendants.95 Criminal

United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 500 (1997).
See id. at 502.
91 Id.
92 See Gregory Klass, Meaning, Purpose, and Cause in the Law of Deception, 100 GEO. L.J.
449, 459–60 (2012) (describing laws against deception as inherently incorporating “highly
structured, if rarely explicitly formulated, rules”).
93 See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground between Criminal and
Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1816–17 (1992) (“[T]he recognition of a punitive purpose has
important procedural consequences . . . .”).
94 See, e.g., Cook Cty. v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 130 (2003) (“[T]he
tipping point between payback and punishment defies general formulation.”).
95 See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 n.8 (1983) (citing Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 515 (1948)) (“[W]here a statute imposes criminal penalties, the standard of certainty
is higher.”).
89
90
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defendants are entitled to greater protections than civil defendants,
for example.96 Defendants also receive greater protection when
facing punitive sanctions in comparison to simply paying
compensation for harms they have generated.97
2. Corporate compliance.
The distinction between overly broad and vague laws is
particularly important in the context of corporate compliance due to
the centrality of uncertainty. Considering the above arguments, it
is possible that bright-line rules regarding fraud and other whitecollar offenses are not socially optimal. Deference to prosecutorial
discretion is one possible response to unclear rules. Consider,
however, the role of effective corporate compliance professionals.
While there may be companies that are looking to gain every
possible advantage by exploiting loopholes in a statutory regime,
there may also be companies making a good faith effort to comply
with a statutory regime.98 A clear understanding of what the laws
require would be helpful to good faith efforts at compliance.
Companies making this effort perform a rational compliance
function in which they police their employees, contractors, and
partners to ensure that all are following the relevant laws.99 This is
rather distinct from non-white collar crimes, where the concept of
“fair notice” more emphasizes the “fairness” aspect rather than
actual notice for offenders. In some ways, internal compliance acts
as a substitute or complement to external enforcement from
prosecutors and regulators.
Uncertainty as to the law’s requirements is a significant
challenge if the compliance officers are to be effective. For corporate
compliance regimes to be effective, the officers creating those
96 See Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1,
18 (2006) (“[A]t trial, a criminal defendant receives an impressive degree of ‘process’
constitutionally required to adjudicate his guilt or innocence.”).
97 See Mann, supra note 93, at 1816–17 (“The Supreme Court [has] made the imposition
of punitive sanctions contingent on heightened procedural protections.”).
98 See H. Lowell Brown, Vicarious Criminal Liability of Corporations for the Acts of Their
Employees and Agents, 41 LOY. L. REV. 279, 308–12 (1995) (discussing the importance of
recognizing corporate good faith efforts).
99 See, e.g., Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1236–
37 (1984) (discussing the importance of contract incentives on a company’s agents); V.S.
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477,
1495 (1996) (noting how shareholders can and cannot monitor corporate activity).
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regimes require actual notice as to prohibited and acceptable
behavior.100 Vague, unclear rules might even exacerbate compliance
problems, as they may facilitate employee rationalization of
illegitimate behavior.101 Furthermore, to ensure that the
compliance regimes are designed in a rational fashion, the relative
consequences of violations should also be clear.102 Society benefits
when companies invest heavily to prevent serious cases of
wrongdoing.103 Vagueness as to the laws creates uncertainty for
compliance officers.
Clearly communicated prosecutorial discretion is one solution to
both overly broad and vague statutes. If prosecutors can
consistently and clearly explain to companies how they should
comply with a statutory scheme, the company’s compliance efforts
are manageable.
If, however, such a trusting relationship between prosecutors
and companies is infeasible, the challenge presented by overly broad
laws in comparison to vague laws can differ.104 Vague laws create
uncertainty, but overly broad laws do not necessarily create

100 See Ellen S. Podgor, Corporate and White Collar Crime: Simplifying the Ambiguous, 31
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 391, 401 (1994) (arguing that existing legislation needs to be corrected to
increase certainty about what constitutes illegal conduct); Khanna, supra note 99, at 1495
(discussing the importance of minimizing monitoring costs); Peter C. Kostant, From Lapdog
to Watchdog: Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307 and A New Role for Corporate Lawyers, 52 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 535, 539 (2007) (describing ABA Model Rule 1.13 as “too vague to provide any
meaningful guidance for lawyers trying to ensure corporate compliance with the law”).
101 See Todd Haugh, The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215,
1218 (2017) (noting that vagueness can lead to employees viewing the rules as illegitimate,
“creating an environment ripe for rationalizations”); D. Daniel Sokol, Policing the Firm, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 785, 807–08 (2013) (noting that vagueness in compliance may lead to a
“decoupling” of actual illegal employee behavior from official corporate standards).
102 See Jeff T. Casey & John T. Scholz, Beyond Deterrence: Behavioral Decision Theory and
Tax Compliance, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 821, 838–39 (1991) (discussing impact of vagueness
on compliance rates in tax).
103 See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23
J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 834–35 (1994) (noting that society benefits from corporate compliance
when corporations are in a better position to sanction their agents than the state).; Daniel R.
Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 323-24 (1996) (corporate
monitoring is desirable “up to the point at which its marginal cost would exceed the marginal
social gain in the form of reduced social harm.”).
104 The existence of private litigation may be another avenue by which companies cannot
rely upon prosecutorial discretion. For example, the possibility of whistleblower actions under
the False Claims Act may expose the company to civil liability even if the Department of
Justice would not otherwise have litigated a particular case of corporate wrongdoing. 35
U.S.C. § 3729 (2012).
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uncertainty for compliance purposes. For example, a company
might believe the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) to be overly
broad but not vague, because it broadly prohibits providing “things
of value” to foreign officials, even though such entertainment would
generally be provided to any private potential customer.105 Although
the company might feel that the FCPA should not penalize
entertainment of public officials, the role of the company’s
compliance officers is understandable. They must oversee the
decision to invite any potential customers to a corporate golf outing
or trade show.106 It may be costly to have compliance attorneys
investigate and approve each invitation, but their responsibility is
clear.107 If the company cannot rely upon prosecutorial discretion to
avoid liability for inviting a government official to an otherwise
legitimate business development event, then the company has a
clear compliance reaction to an overly broad statute: it must avoid
inviting known government officials.108
Predicting a company’s response to vague laws when lacking
prosecutorial guidance is more difficult. A risk-averse company
might address a vague law in similar fashion to an overly broad law
by eliminating any possibility of violation. In the FCPA example, if
the statute instead were unclear as to whether a public official could
be invited to a corporate golf outing, a risk-averse company might
similarly instruct its corporate compliance officers to avoid inviting
any known government officials. Companies with greater risk
tolerance or resources to absorb risk might behave differently,
though, and they may have some advantage over companies with
lower risk tolerance. They may be able to afford more for creative
legal representation, and legal uncertainty provides more room for
creative legal action. Thus, if the goal is to control corporate
behavior through their internal compliance regimes and if
prosecutorial discretion is an insufficient substitute for clear, well-

Mike Koehler, The Facade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 907, 1003 (2010).
See id. (describing how companies utilize costly investigations in deciding who they can
invite to “corporate events in which some fun may take place (e.g. golf)”).
107 See Miriam Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1036 (2008) (describing
the expensive lengths to which corporations will go to impress prosecutors ex ante that they
are acting in compliance).
108 See Koehler, supra note 105, at 1003 (describing how companies fear providing anything
that might be deemed “things of value” to foreign officials because of FCPA restrictions).
105
106
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defined laws, it is possible that overly broad statutes may result in
more predictable corporate behavior than vague statutes.
Nonetheless, the general approach of the Supreme Court in
addressing white-collar statutes is that vagueness and overbreadth
are both undesirable characteristics.109 This article does not purport
to establish some optimal level of vagueness or overbreadth. Rather,
the article’s claim is that the problems of vagueness and
overbreadth each introduce distinct costs to society. An optimal
solution would reduce both vagueness and overbreadth problems,
but such optimal solutions may be unrealistic. A solution that
reduces the problem of overbreadth could theoretically exacerbate
vagueness problems, while a solution that addresses vagueness
could similarly create further overbreadth problems. Such tradeoffs
may be desirable, but they deserve careful analysis.
III. NARROWING STRATEGIES
In the face of these overbreadth and vagueness concerns, the
Supreme Court can take a variety of actions. One possibility is to
strike down a statute. As the Court has recognized, the invalidation
of a statute is “strong medicine” and not to be taken lightly.110 The
more common strategy in addressing white-collar statutes is a
narrowing strategy; it narrows the scope of the statute.111 These
narrowing decisions typically come on the basis of statutory
interpretation, but they may implicate Constitutional concerns.112

See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 (2008) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 769 (1982)).
111 See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 408 (2010) (declining to broaden scope
of honest services fraud because “[r]eading the statute to proscribe a wider range of offensive
conduct . . . would raise the due process concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine”);
McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987) (expressing concern that federal anticorruption doctrine leaves “its outer boundaries ambiguous”); United States v. Sun-Diamond
Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 399 (1999) (utilizing a “narrow, rather than sweeping”
interpretation of a statute prohibiting giving things of value to public officials).
112 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 268 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (expressing judicial preference for “a limiting construction . . . on the challenged
statute” (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973))); Stuart Buck & Mark L.
Rienzi, Federal Courts, Overbreadth, and Vagueness: Guiding Principles for Constitutional
Challenges to Uninterpreted State Statutes, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 381, 391 (2002) (citing Adrian
Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997)) (distinguishing between
constitutional “classical avoidance” and “modern avoidance”); see also John F. Manning, Clear
109
110
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In McDonnell, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of federal
bribery law by permitting public officials to receive payment in
exchange for meetings.113
Narrowing strategies face a variety of criticisms. First is the
substantive concern: the possibility of leaving harmful behavior
unpunished.114 Despite the holding in McDonnell, society may be
worse off by allowing public officials to accept payment in exchange
for meetings. The second concern is the role of the Court.115
Regardless of whether the narrowed statutory scope is socially
optimal, the narrowing decisions are displacing legislative
decisions; Congress intended for broad coverage and wrote the
statutes to encompass such broad coverage.116 The Court’s decision
to intervene is a naked, and perhaps somewhat arbitrary, policy
choice to apply a “clarity tax” on Congress for certain offenses.117
The latter concern regarding the role of the court is somewhat
ameliorated by viewing the process as a dialectic.118 At times, these
decisions have been an express invitation to Congress to clarify the
precise boundaries. The Court’s decision may not be a normative
rejection of a potential enforcement scheme. For example, for forty
years lower federal courts had interpreted the mail and wire fraud
statutes to encompass a public official accepting bribes in exchange
for official actions, known as “honest services” fraud.119 The more
straightforward forms of fraud involve deprivation of tangible
property: a victim is tricked or deceived into parting with money,
for example. Under honest services fraud doctrine, a victim might
be deprived of an intangible right: “the right to have public officials
perform their duties honestly.”120 In 1987, the Supreme Court
Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 399, 400 (2010) (discussing Henry
Monaghan’s view of judicial review as “constitutionally inspired, but not compelled, rules”).
113 See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372 (2016) (finding that a meeting
did not fit into the definition of “official act”).
114 See Deborah Hellman, A Theory of Bribery, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1947, 1948–50 (2017)
(expressing the importance of properly addressing bribery in a functioning democracy).
115 See id. at 1992 (discussing whether the Court should decide this limitation).
116 See Manning, supra note 112, at 402 (“[M]any contend that because clear statement
rules direct courts to select something other than the most natural and probable reading of a
statute, they too displace congressional choice . . . .”).
117 Id. at 403.
118 See Calavita, supra note 78, at 1065 (utilizing dialectic models of lawmaking which put
the “conflicts confronting policymakers within the context of contradictory structural forces”).
119 Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 400 (2010).
120 McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987).
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rejected this approach, noting that the honest services theory of
mail or wire fraud left the “outer boundaries ambiguous” and
declared that “If Congress desires to go further, it must speak more
clearly than it has.”121 McNally dealt with a public official who
obtained insurance for the state of Kentucky and received personal
kickbacks from the insurance companies.122 The Supreme Court
hesitated in allowing the kickbacks alone to constitute fraud.123 It
emphasized the importance of finding harm to Kentucky itself;
there would be mail fraud if Kentucky “would have paid a lower
premium or secured better insurance” in the absence of the
kickbacks.124 Thus, while the Court agreed that the State could be
defrauded in this fashion, the government would actually have to
prove the harm rather than taking a shortcut through honest
services fraud doctrine.125 Congress did answer the Supreme Court’s
call by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1346 to re-establish honest services
fraud.126
This article explores a further concern regarding the Supreme
Court’s reliance on narrowing strategies for white-collar offenses:
the relationship between narrowing and vagueness.
A. THE IMPACT OF VAGUENESS ON THE NARROWING STRATEGY

Concerns regarding vagueness dovetail with the two
aforementioned criticisms of narrowing strategies. First is the
substantive concern. To the extent that the narrowed scope of the
statute is vague, compliance in the vague areas may be reduced.
Whether this is desirable depends on the nature of the narrowing.
Consider McNally. If society is better off allowing public officials to
be punished for accepting kickbacks without proof of actual harm to
the government, then it may be desirable for the McNally opinion
to be vague. The vagueness might increase the probability that
lower courts would find room to punish such kickbacks with little
proof of actual harm. In contrast, if society is better off only
Id. at 360.
Id. at 352–353.
123 Id. at 360–61.
124 Id. at 360.
125 See id. (“We note that as the action comes to us, there was no charge and the jury was
not required to find that the Commonwealth itself was defrauded of any money or property.”).
126 See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402 (2010) (discussing the statute).
121
122
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punishing public officials who tangibly harm the government
through the acceptance of kickbacks, then a clearer rule would be
more desirable.
Vagueness also impacts the potential dialectic regarding the
scope of prohibited behavior. McNally incorporated an express call
for Congress to speak more clearly regarding honest services
fraud,127 and Congress responded by passing 18 U.S.C. § 1346.128
McNally is an example of a clear narrowing strategy, and the impact
of the decision was straightforward for both lower courts and
Congress to understand and respond. Clear judicial holdings can
facilitate the legislative-judicial dialectic.129
Narrowing strategies that increase vagueness create the
potential for delays in the dialectic. Congress may be uncertain as
to the precise impact of the Supreme Court’s decision, so it may
delay in statutory clarification. The vagueness gives lower courts
flexibility in interpreting the Supreme Court’s guidance, and
Congress may be reasonably waiting to see how lower courts apply
the Supreme Court’s holding. To the extent that both Congress and
the Supreme Court are truly uncertain as to the proper course of
action, such a delay in clarity may be desirable. Nonetheless, such
delay remains costly to the parties subject to the statutory
constraints. It is possible that the importance of the rule and the
severity of the vagueness are so great that Congress would still
respond with statutory clarification.
Beyond simple delays, however, the increase in vagueness may
provide the opportunity for a detrimental dialectic.130 Following the
structural theory constraining Congressional efforts in passing
effective white-collar statutes131, it is possible that Congress
actually desires vagueness. Politicians may be able to convince
different interest groups that the vague law is in each group’s
127 See McNally, 483 U.S. at 359–60 (refusing to choose a harsher reading until “Congress
has spoken in clear and definite language”).
128 See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 402.
129 See, e.g., Luke Meier, RLUIPA and Congressional Intent, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1435, 1435–
38 (2007) (discussing dialogue between Congress and the Supreme Court concerning the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Protection Act and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act).
130 See Calavita, supra note 78, at 1045 (introducing the political repercussions of vague
statutory language).
131 See id. (noting how the political economy can make it difficult for Congress to effectively
regulate white-collar crime).
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interest, and the lack of clarity may make such a message palatable.
There may be little interest for Congress to clarify the vagueness.
B. SOURCES OF VAGUENESS IN NARROWING STRATEGIES

One common narrowing strategy in the white-collar context is a
simple elimination of a path of liability. As described above, the
Court’s decision in McNally eliminated honest services fraud as a
potential path for liability.132 This was relatively straightforward;
parties no longer considered that potential doctrinal path.133
Elimination of this doctrinal path did not directly increase
vagueness or create uncertainty.
Similarly, in McDonnell, the Court narrowed the scope of the
offense by narrowing the definition of an “official act.”134 The official
act requirement was a basic requirement of federal bribery law. In
McDonnell, the governor of Virginia had been convicted of federal
bribery offenses on the theory that he had accepted things of value,
such as expensive cars, in exchange for official actions.135 The
Government argued that “Congress used intentionally broad
language” in § 201(a)(3) to describe the scope of an “official act,”
while the governor argued for a narrower definition.136 The Court
disagreed with the Government’s broad interpretation, indicating
that both Congress and prior caselaw supported a narrower
definition of official act that did not include simply setting up a
meeting or organizing an event.137 The Court went further to
reference a number of concerns that supported its statutory
interpretation.138 One, that there might be a chilling effect on
political interaction between public officials and constituents.139
Another was a “vagueness shoal”: that the statute did not provide

See infra notes 119–24 and accompanying text.
It is possible that McNally forced greater complexity because prosecutors had to
demonstrate actual harm in bribery cases. Nonetheless, proof of intent to harm was generally
a requirement in the first place for fraud, so the decision can be understood as placing bribery
cases on the same level as other frauds.
134 See McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2375 (2016).
135 Id. at 2365.
136 Id. at 2367.
137 Id. at 2371–72.
138 Id. at 2372–73.
139 See id. (“Officials might wonder whether they could respond to even the most
commonplace requests for assistance…”).
132
133
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sufficient precision to put public officials on fair notice about
acceptable behavior.140 Despite the Court’s concerns, however, it did
not dismiss the charges against the governor nor did it invalidate
the federal bribery statutes at play.141 While noting that the
governor received “tawdry” or “distasteful” benefits of expensive
cars and watches, the Court noted that criminal law might not be
the appropriate sanctioning mechanism.142
There are, however, more complex narrowing strategies. In this
section, I describe two separate considerations that increase the
threat of vagueness in a narrowing decision. One is the complexity
or vagueness of the element of analysis. A second consideration is
the relationship between the introduced element and the existing
elements of the offense. Both of these aspects of the narrowing
strategy can contribute to increased vagueness.
1. Vagueness of the element itself.
The Court may narrow the breadth of the statute by introducing
an element of analysis that is vague or complex. Consider the
Supreme Court’s narrowing strategy in Skilling. Skilling was the
former CEO of Enron Corporation, an energy company that went
into bankruptcy shortly after Skilling’s departure.143 The
Government uncovered a conspiracy to prop up Enron’s stock prices
by overstating corporate financials.144 Skilling was prosecuted
under an honest services theory of fraud, alleging that he sought to
“deprive Enron and its shareholders of the intangible right of honest
services.”145 The Government alleged that Skilling deceived
shareholders by misrepresenting the company’s health, and that he
profited by selling Enron stock at artificially inflated prices.146
Skilling argued that the honest services statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1346,

140 See id. at 2373 (citing Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 402-03 (2010)) (“Our more
constrained interpretation of 201(a)(3) avoids this ‘vagueness shoal’”).
141 See id. at 2375 (“Because we have interpreted the term ‘official act’ . . . in a way that
avoids the vagueness concerns raised by Governor McDonnell, we decline to invalidate those
statutes under the facts here”).
142 Id.
143 See Skilling, 561 U.S. at 368 (describing the facts surrounding Skilling’s departure and
Enron’s subsequent bankruptcy).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 369.
146 Id. at 413.
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was
unconstitutionally
vague.147
The
statute
appears
straightforward, stating that “For the purposes of th[e] chapter [of
the United States Code that prohibits, inter alia, mail fraud, § 1341,
and wire fraud, § 1343], the term ‘scheme or artifice to defraud’
includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible
right of honest services.”148 Skilling looked at the caselaw describing
this intangible right and described it as a “hodgepodge of oftconflicting holdings that are hopelessly unclear.”149 The Court
rejected Skilling’s argument and held that there was a clear core to
the caselaw: “§ 1346 criminalizes only the bribe-and-kickback core”
of right of honest services fraud.150 The Government argued that
Congress also intended to cover “undisclosed self-dealing by a public
official or private employee.”151 The Court did not agree, finding
Congress’s language insufficiently specific to encompass such
behavior and noting that previous court decisions did not reach a
consensus on which schemes of “non-disclosure and concealment of
material information” qualified.152 We can read the holding of
Skilling as that 18 U.S.C. § 1346 prohibits bribes and kickbacks but
does not prohibit undisclosed self-dealing.
The challenge with Skilling, however, is that the line between
undisclosed self-dealing and a kickback is unclear.153 Consider
Stayton v. United States, in which two men were convicted of honest
services fraud after which Skilling was decided.154 Stayton was an
aviation officer for the Department of Defense who directed a five
million dollar contract to his close friend Childree.155 Childree was
the principal of Maverick Aviation, and because of their friendship,
Stayton intended to take over Maverick Aviation one day.156 Two
weeks after Stayton released the first one million dollar payment to
Maverick Aviation, Childree directed over $60,000 of those funds to

Id. at 399.
Id. at 402 (quoting 18 § U.S.C. 1346 (2012)).
149 Id. at 406–07 (internal quotations omitted).
150 Id. at 409.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 410.
153 See, e.g., United States v. Black, 625 F.3d 386, 391–93 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing the
distinction between honest services fraud and pecuniary fraud).
154 Stayton v. United States, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1260, 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2011).
155 Id. at 1263.
156 Id.
147
148
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pay off Stayton’s second mortgage.157 The two men were acquitted
of bribery but convicted of honest services fraud.158 In overturning
the verdict post-Skilling, the court noted that the $60,000 payoff
could have been both a kickback and an undisclosed conflict of
interest.159 If the $60,000 payoff had been paid because of the one
million dollar contractual award, it would constitute a kickback and
be prohibited as honest services fraud. If, however, the $60,000
payoff represented Stayton’s compensation reflecting his
employment or ownership interest in Maverick Aviation, then the
transaction would be an undisclosed conflict of interest and not be
prohibited under honest services fraud.
Thus, while Skilling narrows the scope of honest services fraud
by ruling out undisclosed self-dealing, it introduces vagueness
through an unclear test: is financial gain by a government employee
more like an illegal kickback or more like undisclosed self-dealing?
We can also contrast Skilling with Yates v. United States. In
Yates, the Supreme Court addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § 1519
covered the destruction of physical evidence.160 The statute
prohibits tampering with “any record, document, or tangible object”
in an attempt to obstruct a federal investigation, and the Court
focused on whether Congress broadly intended for the phrase
“tangible object” to encompass any physical evidence.161 The
plurality determined that Congress did not intend such a broad
definition, reaching its conclusion in part on significant statutory
overlap.162 Existing statutes already covered physical evidence
tampering, which could result in a vagueness related concern due
to overlapping statutory coverage.163 The dissent, however, thought
Congress’s intent was straightforward, stating that “[t]he term
‘tangible object’ is broad, but clear.”164 The narrowing in Yates
Id.
Id. at 1265.
159 Id. at 1269; see also J. B. Perrine & Patricia M. Kipnis, Navigating the Honest Services
Fraud Statute After Skilling v. United States, 72 ALA. LAW. 295, 298 (2011) (describing other
ways prosecutors could target the conduct in Stayton v. United States).
160 See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1077 (2015) (discussing the Court’s focus in
the case).
161 Id. at 1090–91 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)).
162 See id. at 1084–85 (discussing the Court’s conclusion on the statute’s interpretation).
163 See id. (“Virtually any act that would violate § 1512(c)(1) no doubt would violate § 1519
. . . .”).
164 Id. at 1091 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)).
157
158

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss2/3

28

Kwok: Is Vagueness Choking the White-Collar Statute?

2019]

VAGUENESS & THE WHITE-COLLAR STATUTE

523

emphasized a bright-line rule that minimized vagueness. Tangible
objects did not include physical evidence such as fish, but rather
constituted objects that contained information.
2. The element’s relationship with existing elements.
A separate avenue of vagueness is the relationship between the
introduced element of analysis and existing elements of the offense.
First, this relational threat increases the potential for vagueness
and complexity. Second, there is the possibility that the addition of
the element may not actually narrow the scope of liability.
Multifactor balancing tests present an example of this
challenge.165 Multifactor balancing tests incorporate a number of
discrete elements, and the relationship between the elements is not
transparent. An element might overlap significantly with another
element, and it may be unclear how much weight any particular
element carries.166 This indeterminate relationship can create
uncertainty.167 Multipart balancing tests may be useful at post-hoc
explanation or justification of a decision, but they are less useful in
providing future guidance.168 Because of this limitation, multipart
balancing tests may be more desirable in areas where consistency
and clarity are less important.169
Such uncertainty may be compounded by the possibility that
judges may not actually apply the factors as stated. The prevalence
of multiple other factors in a balancing test may cause judges to not
165 See Patrick M. McFadden, The Balancing Test, 29 B.C. L. REV. 585, 643–49 (1988)
(discussing problems of consistency and clarity with balancing tests); In re Kellogg Brown &
Root, Inc., 796 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (expressing dismay at multifactor balancing test
and noting that a test which creates “[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be
certain but results in widely varying application by the courts, is little better than no privilege
at all.” (quoting Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981))).
166 See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 41 (2007) (discussing the problem of overlap in multifactor tests).
167 See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 136 (2014)
(expressing concern that “open-ended balancing tests . . . can yield unpredictable and at times
arbitrary results”); Lea Brilmayer & Raechel Anglin, Choice of Law Theory and the
Metaphysics of the Stand-Alone Trigger, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1169 (2010) (“[B]alancing,
unlike a bright-line rule, does not allow the parties to predict the applicable law.”); David
Crump, Takings by Regulation: How Should Courts Weigh the Balancing Factors?, 52 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1, 3 (2012) (“[A] multifactor balancing test is unavoidably vague.”)
168 See McFadden, supra note 165, at 643–49 (noting balancing tests are “particularly
deficient” in providing guidance for future actions).
169 See id. at 649–51 (suggesting criminal sentencing as a particularly individualized area
in which failure to provide future guidance is less harmful).
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actually rely upon particular factors.170 Despite formalistic
satisfaction of working through each element, complex analysis
without clearly defined relationships between the elements may
lead to post-hoc justification. This post-hoc justification can lead to
vagueness and uncertainty as defendants have difficulty predicting
actual results based on the added elements of analysis.171
A third problem is that a new element may be highly correlated
with an existing element. Under this scenario, the new test does not
actually change the end result because of its correlation with an
existing element.
Consider the multifactor balancing tests for confusion in
trademark infringement cases.172 Nearly all circuits balance at least
five factors in analyzing whether trademark infringement is
causing or likely to cause consumer confusion: the similarity of the
marks, the proximity of the goods, evidence of actual confusion, the
strength of the plaintiff's mark, and the intent of the defendant. 173
In explaining their decisions, courts methodically consider each
factor and often then explicitly balance the factors.174
Empirical analysis of judicial decisions applying these tests,
however, suggests that there is likely a single dispositive factor; the
similarity of the marks, which by itself accurately predicts 90% of
the case outcomes.175 As Professor Beebe discusses, it is possible
that judges may be allowing final outcomes to drive their formal
analysis of other factors.176 Thus, adding another factor into a
multifactor analysis may not result in any actual change regarding
outcomes. The additional factors may instead obscure the reasoning
for the underlying decision.177
170 See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1645–46 (2006) (noting that balancing ten different
factors may be impractical for a judge).
171 See Brilmayer & Anglin, supra note 167, at 1169 (expressing concern that multifactor
balancing tests allow judges to simply impose their personal preferences).
172 See Beebe, supra note 170, at 1586–90 (noting the plethora of different tests across
circuits).
173 Id. at 1589–90.
174 See id. at 1592–93 (“[D]istrict courts give every appearance of scrupulously following a
basic weighted additive decision strategy.”).
175 See id. at 1603 (providing research showing that the similarity factor predicted whether
there would be a preliminary injunction 90% of the time).
176 Id. at 1614–15.
177 See Kenneth C. Haas, The Supreme Court Enters the "Jar Wars": Drug Testing, Public
Employees, and the Fourth Amendment, 94 DICK. L. REV. 305, 323 (1990) (noting that
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We can compare the balancing of these five factors with a brightline rule regarding the first factor: two trademarks must be similar
if there is any possibility of consumer confusion. Some courts have
acknowledged that similarity of the marks is a threshold factor
rather than one of five factors to be balanced.178 Compared to the
scenario in which similarity of the marks is one of five factors to be
balanced, all parties can enjoy reduced vagueness if they know that
similarity of the marks is a threshold factor. Regardless of whether
measuring similarity of the marks is vague or uncertain, to the
extent that the marks are not similar, there is less uncertainty
when that determination is a threshold matter. There is no
likelihood of consumer confusion if the marks are not similar as a
threshold matter. If it is an element of a balancing test, though, then
the parties must still deal with the possibility that some other factor
may outweigh, even if the marks are not similar.
Next, there is the possibility of similarity or relationship between
factors. The Federal Circuit is the one circuit that does not
incorporate the intent of the defendant element.179 Whether the
Federal Circuit has a more expansive or narrow view of consumer
confusion depends on the relationship of defendant intent with the
other elements. According to both doctrine and empirical evidence,
inference of ill defendant intent can be imputed from knowledge of
the similarity of the marks, which is roughly the first element of the
balancing test.180 If these two elements are highly correlated, the
addition of the defendant intent element may not make any
difference in determining consumer confusion.
The lack of specificity regarding the relationship of different
elements in a multipart balancing test creates uncertainty and
unpredictability.

multifactor balancing tests “can be criticized for lacking clarity and for being susceptible to
results-oriented manipulation” in Fourth Amendment cases).
178 See Beebe, supra note 170, at 1623 (“As some courts have recognized, the similarity
inquiry is a threshold inquiry.”).
179 See id. at 1589–90 (“[T]he intent of the defendant, is found in all but the Federal
Circuit’s test.”).
180 See id. at 1630 (“It is black-letter doctrine across the circuits . . . that bad faith intent
may be inferred solely from the fact that the parties’ marks are similar . . . [and] [t]he data
suggests that this circumstantial inference is the leading basis for a finding of bad faith
intent.”).
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This is not an exhaustive categorization of potential narrowing
strategies. Instead, the goal here is to highlight two distinct
channels by which narrowing strategies may have differing impacts
on vagueness concerns. Historically, many of the Supreme Court’s
narrowing efforts in the white-collar context have employed a
relatively straightforward narrowing strategy that does not raise
serious vagueness concerns.181 Nonetheless, courts should be
cautious regarding these two potential avenues of increased
vagueness, as they can work against the effectiveness of the Court’s
underlying goals in narrowing the scope of the statute.
IV. MATERIALITY AND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
We can see evidence of these vagueness problems in the Supreme
Court’s recent decision on the False Claims Act (FCA). The FCA
addresses fraud against the federal government,182 and courts have
struggled to articulate the conditions under which a lie constitutes
legally actionable civil fraud under the FCA. Some lies are relatively
straightforward; an individual might make a claim for disaster
relief reimbursement from the federal government when he did not
actually incur the disaster expense.183 In contrast, some claims are
more complex because they involve some contractual or regulatory
violation, but the claim is not completely false because some service
or product was actually provided. For example, a healthcare
provider bills Medicare for a service that is provided, but it lies
about the physician involved. Federal appellate courts had held that
knowingly identifying the wrong physician supervisor is not fraud
under the FCA, but knowingly identifying the wrong physician
provider is fraud.184

See infra Part III.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012).
183 See, e.g., United States v. Lloyd, 205 F.3d 1348, 1348 (8th Cir. 2000) (explaining that
the government investigated the defendant’s claims and found that he falsely marked rental
bills).
184 Compare United States ex rel. Hobbs v. MedQuest Assocs., Inc., 711 F.3d 707, 714 (6th
Cir. 2013) (finding no FCA liability for improperly identified supervising physician), with
United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding FCA liability for
improperly identified physician provider).
181
182
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In 2016, the Supreme Court stepped in, recognizing both
vagueness and overbreadth concerns in Escobar.185 The Court
recognized the need to clarify lower court decisions that it
condemned as creating “arbitrariness.”186 It also recognized the
potential for overbreadth, noting that Congress did not intend the
FCA to be an “all-purpose antifraud statute.”187 It attempted to
narrow liability by establishing a materiality standard, requiring
lies to concern a matter that had the natural tendency to influence
the listener.188 Justice Thomas described the requirement by posing
a hypothetical: a healthcare provider signs a contract to provide
medical services via the Medicare program.189 As part of the express
contract, the provider is required to use American-made staplers in
assembling the paperwork for reimbursement. The contract states
that this is a material element of the contract and that the contract
is voidable if not satisfied. The provider knows that they do not have
American-made staplers and intends to deceive the federal
government by signing the contract anyway. Can the government
claim it has been defrauded under the FCA? In dicta, Justice
Thomas declared that the hypothetical provider has not defrauded
the government because the matter was not material, emphasizing
his belief that the government would continue to pay despite actual
knowledge of the foreign staplers.190
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court’s decision greatly varies from
previous attempts to address vagueness and overbreadth concerns.
Rather than focusing on a straightforward element of analysis, its
choice of materiality is both complex and highly relational. It is
likely to lead to greater vagueness problems, and it may not reduce
the breadth of coverage.

185 See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002–03 (2016)
(noting that the term “materiality” may have different meanings in contract law and tort law,
and that the FCA raises overbreadth concerns because “billing parties are often subject to
thousands of complex statutory and regulatory provisions”).
186 Id. at 2002.
187 Id. at 2003 (quoting Allison Engine Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008)).
188 See id. at 2003 (noting that “Section 3789(b)(4) defines materiality . . . [as having] a
natural tendency to influence . . .”).
189 Id. at 2004.
190 See id. (noting that the “Government routinely pays claims despite knowing that foreign
staplers were used”).
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A. MATERIALITY IS NOT A SIMPLE ELEMENT

Consider the test suggested by Escobar: focusing on whether the
matter lied about has the natural tendency to influence the
governmental body to which it is addressed.191 This analysis can be
either objective or subjective in that materiality may encompass
what might tend to influence a reasonable person, or it may also
incorporate what the speaker knows is likely to influence a specific
listener.192 Some courts have interpreted this as a strict causation
requirement; the listener would not have agreed to the contract had
they known the truth about the lie.193 In AccuSoft Corp. v. Palo, for
example, the First Circuit seemed to hold that a confidentiality
provision was “important” to the parties, but that it was not
material because it was not an “essential and inducing feature of
the contract.”194 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that although
housing contracts specified “decent, safe and sanitary” conditions,
the “decent, safe and sanitary” language was not material because
the government continued to pay for the unsafe, unsanitary
housing.195
There are two major complications with this emphasis on
causation. The first complication is the tendency towards binary
analysis: either the fraud induced the contract or it did not. The
second complication is a conflation of normative and descriptive
analysis.

191 See id. at 1996 (“What matters is . . . whether the defendant knowingly violated a
requirement that the defendant knows is material to the Government's payment decision.”).
192 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[A]
misrepresentation may be material if it would be likely to induce a reasonable person to
manifest his assent.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (AM. LAW INST, 1977) (“[T]he
maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its recipient regards or is likely
to regard the matter as important in determining his choice of action, although a reasonable
man would not so regard it.”).
193 See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 676 F. Supp. 1158, 1176 n.25 (N.D. Fla. 1987) (“In the
absence of reliance on the false statement, it is difficult to see how the defendant’s false
statement could have ‘caused’ the false claim.”).
194 AccuSoft Corp. v. Palo, 237 F.3d 31, 54 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting Lease-It, Inc. v. Mass.
Port. Auth., 600 N.E.2d 599, 603 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992)).
195 See United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 681 (5th Cir. 2003) (Jones,
J., concurring) (“Since HUD routinely made Section 8 housing assistance payments to owners
of property irrespective of their compliance with the decent, safe and sanitary standard, the
owners' certifications were not material to HUD's decision to pay.”).
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1. Binary analysis.
Causation often seems like binary analysis: either the lie caused
the victim to agree or it did not, which sounds like but-for causation.
Nonetheless, many authorities acknowledge that materiality is not
equivalent to but-for causation.
For example, in looking at false statements, the Seventh Circuit
limited the importance of but-for causality. The court acknowledged
that the FBI could not have been misled by the defendant’s
deception because the FBI knew the truth of the situation, but a
statement could still “be material even though the agency did not
rely on it and was not influenced by it.”196 Rather, it is sufficient
that a misrepresentation “could” cause agents under normal
circumstances to change their behavior.197
Similarly in contracts, material fraud must be likely to induce
manifestation of assent, but:
It is not necessary that this reliance have been the sole
or even the predominant factor in influencing his
conduct. It is not even necessary that he would not have
acted as he did had he not relied on the assertion. It is
enough
that
the
manifestation
substantially
contributed to his decision to make the contract.198
The Restatement (Second) of Torts also affirms a “substantial
factor” rather than but-for causation in evaluating materiality.199
These arguments reflect the idea that decisions are rarely binary
between sophisticated parties. Once we move away from but-for
causality, though, we are left with little guidance. A contract might
involve greater compensation or oversight in the face of deception.
One party might demand greater concessions in the face of evidence
that the other party engaged in deception. It is likely difficult for
judges or juries to intuit the level of impact minor clauses might
have on a sophisticated party’s decision making process. The
meaning of this substantial contribution is unclear and only seems

196 United States v. Turner, 551 F.3d 657, 663 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v.
Dick, 744 F.2d 546, 553 (7th Cir. 1984)).
197 Id. at 663 (quoting United States v. Ranum, 96 F.3d 1020, 1028 (7th Cir.1996)).
198 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 167 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
199 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 546 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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to reflect the intuitive response concerning triviality. Particularly
with relatively sophisticated parties, economic theory suggests that
nearly any fact may have influence on the execution of a contract; it
is rather that transaction costs might limit the parties from actively
negotiating relatively trivial elements.200 On deontological, rather
than consequential grounds, theorists further argue that even
disbelieved lies have a negative impact on listeners and society.201
2. Confusing normative and positive analysis.
This causal line of reasoning also seems to conflate positive and
normative approaches towards materiality. Does this “substantial
factor” analysis reflect a description of how individuals consider
information or rather a normative approach from courts?
Consider one variant of materiality analysis in puffery. Various
legal authorities suggest that companies may lie through puffery:
making exaggerated or grandiose claims about their products and
services.202 For example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts notes
that:
The habit of vendors to exaggerate the advantages of
the bargain that they are offering to make is a well
recognized fact. An intending purchaser may not be
justified in relying upon his vendor's statement of the
value . . . as carrying with it any assurance that the
thing is such as to justify a reasonable man in praising
it so highly.203

200 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J.
926, 941–42 (2010) (arguing that courts should interpret contracts in a way that reflects the
parties’ preferences); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 292–93 (6th ed.
Addison Wesley 2016) (“The parties expect to save transaction costs by leaving gaps in
contracts whenever the actual cost of negotiating explicit terms exceeds the expected cost of
filling a gap.”).
201 See SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORTALITY, AND THE
LAW 20–21 (2014) (“Although lies may but need not deceive their recipients, I have assumed
that lies without any connection to deception are nonetheless wrong and that their moral
defect is shared with those lies that also involve deception or its attempt.”).
202 See Stefan J. Padfield, Is Puffery Material to Investors? Maybe We Should Ask Them, 10
U. PA. J. BUS. & EMP. L. 339, 340 (2008) (“‘Puffery’ has been defined as ambiguous,
promotional, or hyperbolic speech commonly known as ‘sales talk.’”).
203 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 539 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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If a statement is puffery, it is not material for fraud purposes.204 The
problem, however, is that empirical research suggests people
actually are influenced by puffery.205 Naturally, if courts protect
such lies as immaterial and thus not actionable fraud, companies
have every reason to lie. Not surprisingly, judicial decisions based
on puffery as immaterial fraud are conflicting. In consumer falseadvertising law, for example, a claim that motor oil provided “longer
engine life and better engine protection” was material and thus
actionable,206 but the sale of the “Most Advanced Home Gaming
System in the Universe” was puffery and thus not material.207 In
securities litigation, some courts have claimed that reasonable
investors would not rely on “[i]mmaterial statements [that] include
vague, soft, puffing statements or obvious hyperbole,” and courts
should not facilitate litigation of “generalized statements of
optimism that are not capable of objective verification.”208 Other
courts, however, have noted that a director’s imprecise opinion that
a transaction is of “high” value or has “fair” terms can be deemed a
material fraud.209
This confusion regarding normative versus descriptive efforts is
sometimes described as a vagueness or opinion problem. In
contracts, for example, misrepresentations of fact may make a
contract voidable, while misrepresentations of opinion do not.210
This rule has been criticized as “logical absurdity.”211 The Fifth
Circuit has raised parallel concerns about whether deception
regarding “[d]ecent, safe, and sanitary” in housing can be the basis
of a fraud claim, noting that “‘[d]ecent, safe, and sanitary’ is a
meaningful and useful description of homes and apartment houses,

Id.
See Padfield, supra note 202, at 358 (noting numerous empirical studies finding that
individuals cannot ignore optimistic statements and expressions of confidence); David A.
Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1395, 1395 (2006) (arguing that many
individuals rely on puffery despite the law’s assumption that they do not).
206 Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 953 (3d Cir. 1993).
207 Atari Corp. v. 3DO Co., No. C 94-20298 RMW (EAI), 1994 WL 723601, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
May 16, 1994).
208 In re Ford Motor Co. Sec. Litig., 381 F.3d 563, 570 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting In re K-tel
Int’l., Inc. Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881, 897 (8th Cir. 2002)).
209 Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1093 (1991).
210 7 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 28.17 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 168).
211 Id. (citing 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1919 (3d ed. 1940)).
204
205
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but it is not precise or measurable.212 The Court further pointed out
that “[t]here will be wide difference of opinion of what is, and what
is not, decent, safe, or sanitary.”213 It is hard to believe that people
are not deceived when they receive unsafe or unsanitary housing,
but the Fifth Circuit decision seems to imply that people who
actually want decent, safe, and sanitary housing should not believe
such general claims.
This causation line of arguments surrounding materiality
provides little guidance to judges or jurors. This problem is only
magnified in dealing with sophisticated parties: how should a juror
determine what might influence a complex entity such as the
federal government? Moreover, courts may conflate the normative
and descriptive approaches to causation, as it is unclear whether a
juror should apply her judgment as to what lies should influence the
government as opposed to which lies actually influence the
government.
B. MATERIALITY IS HIGHLY RELATED WITH EXISTING ELEMENTS OF
FRAUD

Not only is analysis of materiality itself complex, but the element
of materiality is likely related to existing elements of fraud.
Evaluating materiality likely requires reconsideration of these
other factors, and a failure to understand the interaction may create
vagueness and uncertainty. Moreover, it may also fail to narrow the
scope of the offense.
1. Materiality’s link to mens rea.
Materiality may be connected with the mens rea of fraud. If the
defendant’s lie has the natural tendency to influence the listener,
the defendant is demonstrating his intent to deceive the listener. As
an example, consider 18 U.S.C. § 1014, a federal statute prohibiting
bank fraud.214 The statute does not contain any express mention of
materiality. The Supreme Court determined that 18 U.S.C. § 1014
does not contain an implied materiality element, noting that:

212
213
214

United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 675 (5th Cir. 2003).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1014 (2012).
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A statement made “for the purpose of influencing” a
bank will not usually be about something a banker
would regard as trivial, and "it will be relatively rare
that the Government will be able to prove that" a false
statement "was . . . made with the subjective intent" of
influencing a decision unless it could first prove that the
statement has “the natural tendency to influence the
decision.”215
Therefore, the Supreme Court in Wells seemed to believe that the
mens rea requirement for purposely influencing the victim would
greatly overlap with any potential materiality requirement.216 Some
courts, following the Wells logic, describe materiality as equivalent
to mens rea; a “representation is material if ‘it is made to induce
action or reliance by another’”217 Under this formulation of
materiality, there is no need to prove an independent element of
materiality for a fraud conviction.
This is of particular importance in the FCA context because the
civil FCA incorporates a mens rea of knowledge and expressly
rejects “specific intent to defraud.”218 One possible interpretation of
the Supreme Court’s addition of the materiality standard is to
narrow the scope of the FCA by increasing the effective mens rea
requirement to “intent to defraud.” Lower courts may find this
reasoning difficult, though, as it seems to contradict the express
statutory language.
An alternative interpretation of the Supreme Court’s addition of
the materiality standard is that courts should apply a sliding scale.
For serious lies, the standard mens rea of knowledge is sufficient to
215 United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997) (citing Kungys v. United States, 485
U.S. 759, 780–781 (1988)).
216 See id. (“[T]he literal reading of the statute will not normally take the scope of § 1014
beyond the limit that a materiality requirement would impose.”). Cf. Digital Equip. Corp. v.
Diamond, 653 F.2d 701, 716 (1st Cir. 1981) (“Questions of ‘materiality’ and ‘culpability’ are
often interrelated and intertwined, so that a lesser showing of the materiality of withheld
information may suffice when an intentional scheme to defraud is established, whereas a
greater showing of the materiality of withheld information would necessarily create an
inference that its nondisclosure was ‘wrongful.’”).
217 United States v. LeVeque, 283 F.3d 1098, 1103–04 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing United States
v. Halbert, 712 F.2d 388, 390 (9th Cir. 1983)).
218 See 37 U.S.C. § 3729 (b)(1)(B) (2012) (“For the purposes of this section . . . the terms
‘knowing’ and ‘knowingly’ . . . require no proof of specific intent to defraud.”).
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establish liability. For more trivial lies, however, the prosecution
must either prove a higher level of mens rea or demonstrate how the
victim (the government) would have been influenced by the lie.
Beyond the confusion as to the precise interaction between mens
rea and materiality, note that the application of this test could also
theoretically increase the scope of liability. Normally, the
application of a materiality standard should decrease the scope of
liability; trivial lies that do not have the natural tendency to
influence the victim should not incur liability. It is possible, though,
that it may be difficult to establish the defendant’s knowing mens
rea of the trivial lie: large corporations may not pay significant
attention to the actual truth of small details. By applying this
materiality standard, however, a court might be satisfied by the
demonstration of intent to deceive. Even if the corporation did not
know the truth about its assertion, the demonstration of its intent
to deceive the government might find a basis for liability through
materiality analysis.
2. Materiality’s link to harm.
Analysis of materiality may also force reconsideration of the
harm caused by the lie. Some courts claim that there are lies that
do not cause harm and therefore are not material. One version of
this is a triviality argument that parallels a de minimis harm
function; the Second Circuit has described an undisclosed bribe such
as a “free telephone call, luncheon invitation, or modest Christmas
present” as not material fraud.219
Some courts go even further, however, and claim that there is no
harm from some lies. The case of Security Life Insurance Co. of
America v. Meyling embraces this strong approach. Meyling was an
executive of a small company that purchased health insurance from
the plaintiff insurance company; Meyling lied about his medical
history and obtained a discounted premium, resulting in at least
$5,775 in savings to Meyling.220 The policy included language
indicating that retroactive adjustments to the premium were

219 United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 146 (2nd Cir. 2003); see also United States v.
Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 519–23 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding that illegal fraud requires “sufficient
detriment” to the deceived party).
220 Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Meyling, 146 F.3d 1184, 1186 (9th Cir. 1998).
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permissible if misstatements were discovered.221 Meyling suffered a
coronary aneurysm, resulting in medical bills totaling $670,000.222
The insurance company then discovered Meyling’s prior undisclosed
negative medical history and attempted to rescind Meyling’s
insurance contract based on fraud.223 The court held that, although
Meyling attempted to defraud the insurance company, rescission
was not permissible in this case.224 “[W]hen an insurer does not
claim it altered its conduct in reliance on the misrepresentation and
cannot demonstrate net economic consequences, it has not
established materiality.”225 Because the insurance company could
not show that it would not have issued health insurance had it
known the truth of Meyling’s prior conditions but would rather have
simply charged the proper non-discounted premium in the first
place, the court indicated that the fraud did not influence the
insurance company’s decision.226 Because it included a clause in the
contract that allowed for the company to retroactively adjust
premiums, the court believed there were no net losses to the
insurance company.227
An older criminal fraud materiality case is United States v.
Regent Office Supply Co. Regent dealt with salespeople who lied to
prospective customers to get them to engage in conversation, such
as falsely claiming that the seller was in financial distress or had
been personally referred to the prospective customer.228 While the
lie was effective in convincing the customers to engage in
conversation, the customers received accurate information about
the products they purchased.229 The court held that there was no
fraud because the lies were immaterial although the court also
noted its distaste for the salespeople’s deception by explaining “[w]e
do not, however, condone the deceitfulness such business practices
represent . . . . On the contrary, we find these ‘white lies’ repugnant

221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229

Id.
Id. at 1187.
Id.
Id. at 1193.
Id.
Id. at 1192.
Id.
United States v. Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d 1174, 1182 (2d Cir. 1970).
Id. at 1182.
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to ‘standards of business morality.’”230 The Second Circuit decision
demonstrates the link between materiality and harm. It states that
the salespeople’s lies were not fraud because “no injury was shown
to flow from the deception,” as the customers received accurate
information about the products they purchased.231
We can compare the Regent style of analysis with a damages
decision by the Fifth Circuit. In Ab-Tech Construction Inc. v. United
States, the contractor did not comply with the terms of the Small
Business Act; the government intended to award the contract to a
company that was legitimately a small business.232 Despite not
properly being a small business, the contractor did construct the
automated data processing facility in accordance with the physical
specifications.233 While the government paid $1.4 million to Ab-Tech
and requested $4.2 million plus interest as trebled damages, the
court found there were no damages to treble.234 The court reasoned
that “viewed strictly as a capital investment, the Government got
essentially what it paid for.”235 The required element of being a
small business was certainly material, as the government would not
have awarded the contract had the business not qualified under the
SBA, but the court did not find damages in the scenario.
These decisions recognize the link between materiality and
harm. If materiality is simply a restatement of the harm
requirement, analysis of materiality may not contribute much to a
court’s inquiry into FCA liability. Note, however, that incorporating
a materiality standard might also expand contract liability. Ab-Tech
demonstrates the possibility that materiality analysis would
expand liability over a purely damages-based decision. Even though
there were no actual damages, the lie was material and thus
actionable in Ab-Tech. In contrast, materiality may be a shortcut to
restrict the scope of liability if harms are difficult to calculate. It is
not true that there is no harm from the deception in Regent; the
customers ended up doing business with “repugnant”236 entities,
Id. at 1179.
Id. at 1182.
232 Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 432–33 (1994), aff'd, 57 F.3d
1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
233 Id. at 434.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Regent Office Supply Co., 421 F.2d at 1179.
230
231
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and we can certainly understand how customers, knowing the truth,
would rather not reward such behavior. Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in Meyling does a disservice to the idea of harm.
Dealing with customers who lie and cheat is costly; the fact that the
contract stipulates a compensatory remedy to deal with a different
payment does not mean that the insurance company is actually in
the same position as before. The process is costly, and we can also
intuit that an honest insurance company would not want to sign up
customers that are deliberately lying from the start.
Deliberate lies are costly, and it can be difficult to ascertain the
harms caused to both the listener and to society at large. It is
entirely possible that some lies are so trivial that no one actually
cares about the lies, and thus there is no tangible harm. These cases
suggest, however, that the harm approach is not limited to such
trivial matters.
C. OTHER CONFUSING FACTORS

I should acknowledge that there are other reasons to find
Escobar confusing. First, Escobar is based off an untrue claim.
Contrary to Justice Thomas’s assertions, there is no prior
agreement as to the need for the element of materiality across
various areas of law.
Justice Thomas claims that materiality is a nearly universal
element across criminal and civil law.237 This argument is plainly
incorrect. In the narrow FCA context alone, lower courts do not even
agree as to whether the criminal FCA contains a materiality
requirement. 238 In the broader criminal context, there is similarly

237 See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002
(2016) (emphasizing that “the common law could not have conceived of fraud without proof of
materiality” (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1999)).
238 Compare United States v. Pruitt, 702 F.2d 152, 155 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that
materiality is an essential element of a § 287 charge), and United States v. Snider, 502 F.2d
645, 652 n.12 (4th Cir. 1974) (explaining that “materiality’ has been required as an element
of the offense”) with United States v. Parsons, 967 F.2d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1992) (noting that
“materiality is not an element required by 18 U.S.C. § 287”), United States v. Logan, 250 F.3d
350, 358 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[M]ateriality is not an element of . . . 18 U.S.C. § 287”), United
States v. Upton, 91 F.3d 677, 685 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that “materiality is not an element
of § 287”), and United States v. Elkin, 731 F.2d 1005, 1009 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Since the language
of § 287 in no way suggests that materiality is an element of the offense, we conclude that
proof of materiality was not required.”); see also United States v. White, 27 F.3d 1531, 1535
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little agreement. A survey of roughly 100 federal criminal false
statement offenses finds that roughly half contain a materiality
requirement.239 At times, courts have interpreted the absence of an
express materiality term as intentional Congressional removal of
such a requirement.240 Other times, courts have found an implied
materiality requirement despite the lack of express language.241
Judge Kozinski compiled his list of criminal statutes in 1994,242 and
courts continue to vary. A review in 2017 shows that courts have
since held that some of these statutes do not contain an implied
materiality element.243
Compounding matters, Justice Thomas declined to address
whether common law or the statutory text governed regarding the
origins of the materiality standard the Court imposed.244
Second, Escobar adopts an unusual materiality standard that
conflates criminal and civil law principles. It imposes a materiality
standard for civil fraud that does not reflect existing civil contract
principles, and it counterintuitively makes imposition of civil fraud
liability more difficult than criminal fraud liability.

(11th Cir. 1994) (“The four circuits that have addressed the issue of whether materiality is
an element of a section 287 offense are evenly split.”).
239 See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 505 (1997) (finding that forty-two of one
hundred federal false statement statutes contain a materiality requirement).
240 See id. at 483 (inferring that removal of materiality implies that materiality is not an
element of making false statements to a federally insured bank under 18 U.S.C. § 1014).
241 See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1999) (citing BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 579 (1996)) (noting that fraud cannot be conceived of without proof
of materiality).
242 U.S. v. Gaudin, 28 F.3d 943, 959–60 (9th Cir. 1994) (J. Kozinski, J., dissenting).
243 See United States. v. Condon, 132 F.3d 653, 656 (1998) (finding that 15 U.S.C. § 645
does not include a materiality requirement); Abramski v. United States., 573 U.S. 169, 191
(2014) (noting that there is no materiality requirement in gun dealer statements under 18
U.S.C. § 924); United States v. Youssef, 547 F.3d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that
there is no materiality requirement in naturalization proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 1015);
United States v. Eriksen, 639 F.3d 1138, 1151 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that there is no
materiality requirement for false ERISA documents under 18 U.S.C. § 1027); United States
v. Lebreault-Feliz, 807 F.3d 1, 5–6, (1st Cir. 2015) (finding no materiality requirement in
passport applications under 18 U.S.C. § 1542). But see United States v. Pirela Pirela, 809
F.3d 1195, 1202 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding implied materiality element in immigration
documents under 18 U.S.C. § 1546).
244 See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002
(2016) (“We need not decide whether § 3729(a)(1)(A)’s materiality requirement is governed by
§ 3729(b)(4) or derived directly from common law.”).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss2/3

44

Kwok: Is Vagueness Choking the White-Collar Statute?

2019]

VAGUENESS & THE WHITE-COLLAR STATUTE

539

As Justice Thomas correctly noted, materiality can be found as a
term in contract law.245 Materiality can be an element of analysis in
determining whether a party has a right to void a contract. A
mistaken assumption, for example, can void a contract if it has “a
material effect.”246 For example, if a party agrees to sell a piece of
land whose value is tied to the presence of timber, the buyer can
void the contract if it turns out the trees had unknowingly been
destroyed by fire.247 The mistake regarding the presence of trees had
a material effect on the transaction. In contrast, assume a buyer
and seller agree to transfer Blackacre for $100,000, and both parties
believe Blackacre contains 100 acres of land. It turns out both
parties are mistaken; Blackacre actually contains 110 acres of land.
Without any additional facts, the sales contract is not voidable by
either party.248
According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, however,
materiality is not an element of fraud when voiding a contract.249
The Restatement allows a party to void a contract due to
misrepresentation under two circumstances: if a misrepresentation
is either material or fraudulent.250 Under this disjunctive
construction, voiding a contract does not require materiality if the
plaintiff can establish fraud. In contrast to the Blackacre example
above, if the seller knew Greenacre contained only 90 acres but told
the buyer Greenacre contained 100 acres, the buyer could void the
contract regardless of the materiality of those 10 additional acres.251
If the plaintiff wishes to void the contract but cannot establish
fraud, then the misrepresentation must be material.
The express disregard of materiality in voiding a contract for
fraud has attracted some questions. Some commentators are
suspicious, noting that nonmaterial fraud is unlikely because it
must still induce behavior from the victim.252
Id. at 2003 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §162 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)).
Id. at §§152, 153.
247 Id. at §152 illus. 1.
248 Id. at illus. 8.
249 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (noting that
either a fraudulent or material misstatement that induces assent justifies voiding a contract).
250 Id. at § 164.
251 Id. at illus. 1.
252 See, e.g., Stephanie R. Hoffer, Misrepresentation: The Restatement's Second Mistake,
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 115, 141–42 (2014) (citing FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §4.12, at 459 (2d
ed. 1998) (stating that cases granting rescission for non-material fraud are “difficult to find”)).
245
246
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In one way, the materiality standard presented in Escobar makes
sense when comparing criminal fraud to contractual breach. These
two conceptions of materiality are functionally similar. In the same
way that a breach must be sufficiently serious, or material, to allow
a plaintiff to void a contract, criminal fraud materiality must be
sufficiently serious to merit punishment. This is not to say that
these two categories fully overlap; it is possible that a lie might be
sufficiently serious to merit punishment even though a breach
concerning the same matter might not be sufficient grounds to merit
voiding the contract. Nonetheless, the two standards serve a similar
purpose: removing some less serious breaches or lies from
consideration.
The problem, however, is that Escobar addresses civil fraud
materiality. Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
materiality is expressly rejected as an element for voiding a contract
if fraud is alleged.253 Thus, if the defendant lied and the basis for
rescission is the lie, the Restatement indicates that there is no
materiality limitation.254
This is not to say that there is no limit to the triviality of a lie in
fraud in contract law. Plaintiffs still must satisfy the standard civil
requirements of demonstrating harm and causation. If the plaintiff
did not suffer any harm, or if the lie did not influence the plaintiff,
then there is no basis for a civil action. The key here, however, is
that in contract law the limitation for fraud is distinct from the
materiality limitation. Stated another way, contract law recognizes
that it is possible to tell a material lie about an immaterial matter.
Materiality is an element of contractual breach, but contractual
breach materiality is not the same as materiality in civil fraud. The
fact that contractual breach materiality is similar to criminal fraud
materiality is an unfortunate coincidence in the civil fraud context.
Worse yet, the Escobar formulation of materiality actually
narrows civil fraud materiality in comparison to criminal fraud
materiality. The common law describes the materiality requirement
as applying to the misrepresentation: the lie must be material.255 A
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §162 (AM. LAW INST 1981).
Id.
255 See, e.g., Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Or., N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 1987)
(Boochever, J., dissenting) (explaining one of the elements of common law fraud is the
representation’s materiality).
253
254
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lie must have the capability or natural tendency to influence the
listener. Instead, the Supreme Court rephrased the civil fraud
materiality requirement as applying to the facts: “well-settled
meaning of ‘fraud’ require[s] a misrepresentation or concealment of
material fact.”256 This is a narrowing of the doctrine, stemming from
contract law in which specific terms of a contract can be designated
material or not. As noted above, if there is no fraud, voiding a
contract requires that the breach concern a material term.
This reformulation focusing on material facts rather than
material lies requires justification. Consider the rock band Van
Halen’s infamous “brown M&M” contract provision.257 Van Halen
would include a clause in their performance contract requiring
provision of a bowl of M&Ms with the brown candies removed. 258
The band had no personal preferences regarding the brown candies,
but they recognized that their musical production was highly
complex and technical.259 Upon arrival, they could quickly check for
the presence of brown M&Ms.260 If a site failed to follow the brown
M&M provision, the band interpreted that as a signal that the site
was not careful in reading and following the technical contract
provisions.261 The band could then exercise greater caution in
verifying compliance with the technical provisions that were a real
danger, such as electrical and structural requirements.262
Phrased in terms of materiality as importance, the factual
presence of a brown M&M itself was not material to Van Halen, but
the fact that the other party had not paid proper attention to the
clause was material to the band. The site’s failure to respect the
brown M&M clause affected their decision-making process and was
costly because the band would then perform additional inspections
of the site’s setup.
256 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1999) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 538 (AM. LAW INST 1977).
257 See Tom W. Bell, Unconstitutional Quartering, Governmental Immunity, and Van
Halen's Brown M&M Test, 82 TENN. L. REV. 497, 532 (2015) (citing David Mikkelson, Van
Halen’s Concert Contract Required No Brown M&Ms?, SNOPES, Jan. 19, 2017,
http://www.snopes.com/music/artists/vanhalen.asp (providing details on the Van Halen
clause)).
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id.
261 Id.
262 Id.
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Besides the signaling value, this distinction is also important
because civil fraud should not simply replicate simple contractual
breach. As the Restatement notes, simple contractual breaches
should be treated differently than fraud.263 It is one thing to be
negligent in satisfying a contract; it is another thing to lie about the
contract.
The Court may have good reasons for selecting this particular
formulation of the materiality standard, but it is not apparent from
the Escobar decision. If, as the Court emphasizes, the common law
is the basis for its decision, perhaps civil fraud should return to the
original common law formulation: the materiality of the lie, as
opposed to the narrower materiality of the factual provision itself.
A lie may be material because the listener attaches importance to
the lie itself, or it may also be material because the listener attaches
value to the factual matter underlying the deception.
Let us return to the Escobar hypothetical. From a criminal fraud
perspective, we likely agree with Justice Thomas’s intuition: it
seems unreasonable to imprison an individual for lying about the
stapler’s country of origin when the contract focuses upon
healthcare services. If the case had been a simple contractual
breach case, we similarly would agree that a breach of the stapler’s
country-of-origin provision would not be material. The government
would not be entitled to void the entire healthcare contract based
solely on such a breach.
Less clear, however, is if such a lie is material for civil fraud
purposes. Under contract law principles, we would consider whether
such deception would influence the government. Justice Thomas
emphasizes his belief that the government would continue to do
business with a healthcare provider that lied about the stapler’s
country of origin, and that the continued business implies a lack of
influence.264 The Restatement, however, recognizes that “influence”
is not synonymous with an actual change in decision.265
263 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (providing for
voiding a contract if there is a fraudulent misrepresentation).
264 See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2004
(2016) (disagreeing with the government that liability would attach if they routinely used the
staplers).
265 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (allowing for
rescission of a contract regardless of whether the fraud actually influenced the party’s
decision).
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Unsurprisingly, Justice Thomas’s hypothetical provides little
clarification as to the civil fraud materiality standard.
D. POST-ESCOBAR EVIDENCE

We can see evidence of the confusion post-Escobar. Appellate
courts continue to conflict about the importance of the Escobar
materiality test. The Ninth Circuit, for example, has noted that
there might be various reasons why the government would continue
to pay despite actual knowledge of the violations and has declined
to hold such violations immaterial.266 Other circuits have held in
favor of defendants, emphasizing the government’s continued
payments as evidence of immateriality.267
Consider the recent Trinity case in the Fifth Circuit.268 Trinity
was a company that produced highway guardrail products that
prevent drivers from running off the road; these products were often
paid for by the federal government.269 To be eligible for federal
reimbursement, the guardrail products could be subjected to
required testing unless they were “nearly certain to be safe.”270
Trinity’s products were approved for federal use in 2000 by the
FHWA (Federal Highway Administration).271 In 2005, Trinity
modified its product and submitted documentation and test results
for federal approval, which was granted.272 A whistleblower
discovered, however, that Trinity had made additional,
undocumented changes to the product, including a reduction of a
266 See United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 862 F.3d 890, 906 (9th Cir. 2017)
(explaining that continuing to pay a party after learning that a certain requirement was
violated is not dispositive on the issue of materiality). But see United States ex rel. Kelly v.
Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 334 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding government’s continued payment as
evidence of immateriality).
267 See D'Agostino v. ev3, Inc., 845 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2016) (explaining that the FDA failure
to withdraw approval after alerted makes it both not material and not causal); United States
ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 490 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that the Center
for Medicare and Medicaid Services continual payments after full knowledge of
noncompliance rendered the provision immaterial); United States ex rel. McBride v.
Halliburton Company, 848 F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (dismissing the suit because the
Administrative Contracting Officer continued payments even with knowledge of
noncompliance).
268 United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 872 F.3d 645 (5th Cir. 2017).
269 Id. at 648.
270 Id.
271 Id.
272 Id.
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five inch guide channel to a four inch guide channel that allegedly
made the product more dangerous.273 The whistleblower notified the
FHWA, which then contacted Trinity. Trinity explained that the
non-disclosure was inadvertent, and that the reported test results
were actually based upon the four inch guide channel design.274 The
FHWA declined to intervene in the case and continued to reimburse
for the Trinity product.275 Although the federal government declined
to intervene, one of the states intervened in litigation.276 Harman,
the whistleblower, proceeded with litigation and won in a jury
trial.277 After the jury result, the FHWA ordered independent
testing by a joint task force of transportation experts that examined
over one thousand Trinity guardrail installations.278 They found no
evidence of multiple versions of Trinity products, nor did they find
any products that deviated from the 2005 crash test results.279
The Fifth Circuit reversed the jury award, holding that any
misrepresentation to the government was not material.280 The court
emphasized that the FHWA did not change its consistent position
that Trinity’s products were reimbursement eligible, thus satisfying
the Escobar dicta.281 Although there was a serious nationwide
investigation as to the allegations post-jury verdict, the court
described that investigation as to the materiality of the jury verdict
rather than the materiality of the initial non-disclosure.282
Of particular note in Trinity is the appellate court’s decision to
consider, but not base, its holding on a variety of other elements of
the case. It recognized that the case could have been decided on the
basis of mens rea, namely that Trinity did not know that its
certification was false.283 It also expressed concern that “the proper
measure of damages should be zero” in the case, but again did not
Id. at 649.
Id. at 650.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 665.
277 Id. at 651.
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id. at 664.
281 See id. at 668 (noting that FHWA’s unwavering position regarding the eligibility of
Trinity’s products for reimbursement indicated that the statements were immaterial to its
decision to pay).
282 Id. at 665.
283 See id. at 657–60 (discussing whether Trinity acted with the requisite scienter).
273
274

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss2/3

50

Kwok: Is Vagueness Choking the White-Collar Statute?

2019]

VAGUENESS & THE WHITE-COLLAR STATUTE

545

overturn the verdict on this basis.284 As other courts have
recognized, the decision on materiality effectively is a
reconsideration of the government’s decision in addressing the
discovered problem.
I highlight Trinity first to demonstrate Escobar’s impact on lower
court’s decisions. My intent is not to determine whether a
materiality element in the FCA is in society’s best interests or part
of Congress’s original intent. Rather, my interest is to consider the
impact on companies like Trinity and whistleblowers.
1. Impact on Trinity.
As an immediate matter, Trinity should be pleased to escape
FCA liability for the non-disclosure of the guide channel size
change. From a broader perspective, however, the decision
emphasizes the ongoing, significant uncertainty for companies like
Trinity in determining whether they are subject to FCA liability for
nondisclosure of regulatory violations or contractual breaches. The
materiality decision in Trinity focused primarily upon the
government’s immediate actual response in learning of the
nondisclosed information. It did not, for example, focus on how the
government should respond nor some objective standard by which
companies should be judged. As applied, this materiality standard
is beneficial to companies that can accurately predict government
responses to their improper behavior. Some courts have been
suspicious about relying on government reactions, recognizing the
possibility that government officials may also display a disregard
for the law.285 The bottom line, though, is that the decision gives
minimal future guidance as to the types of contractual problems and
regulatory violations that create FCA liability. Unless companies
have an excellent relationship with regulators, it is unclear how
much effort they should dedicate towards compliance efforts given
the numerous regulations and terms involved in government
Id. at 652–53.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Durcholz v. FKW Inc., 189 F.3d 542, 545 n.2 (7th Cir.
1999) (recognizing that officials “may have stretched the contracting regulations to or beyond
their limits”); United States ex rel. Asch v. Teller, Levit & Silvertrust, P.C., No. 00 C 3289,
2004 WL 1093784, at *3 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 2004) (expressing concern that “a contractor in
cahoots with a government official would be insulated from a [FCA] suit”); see also David
Kwok, The Private Partners in Public Corruption, 32 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y
467, 467 (2018) (discussing how public officials can enable fraud).
284
285
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contracts. In the future, if Trinity should discover an undisclosed
two-inch deviation in the guide channel size, rather than a one-inch
deviation, the court’s decision gives little guidance outside of relying
on Trinity’s prediction of how the government is likely to react in
learning of such information.
2. Impact on whistleblowers.
Similarly, the uncertainty surrounding the materiality standard
places a burden on whistleblowers. Although the whistleblower in
Trinity was not an employee of the company, many whistleblowers
take significant risks with their careers in bringing FCA actions. A
clear understanding of the types of contractual violations or
breaches that would be material under the FCA would be helpful to
a potential whistleblower. As noted above, though, Trinity’s
definition of materiality seems to hinge on the government’s actual
response to learning of the violations. It is highly unlikely that a
whistleblower would be able to accurately predict the government’s
response. Subjecting whistleblowers to the risk that the government
may fail to act on their offered information likely deters some
whistleblowers from coming forward.
E. PROMOTING CLARITY IN THE FCA

The premise of this Part is not that the Escobar materiality
standard for the FCA is necessarily wrong, but rather that the
attempt at narrowing liability has created vagueness problems. The
Supreme Court recognized both overbreadth and vagueness
problems, and it could have chosen other narrowing strategies that
would have been clearer. For example, the Supreme Court could
have established a minimum harm requirement to narrow the scope
of liability. The government would have to demonstrate a minimum
amount of harm, perhaps $75,000, from fraud in order to bring an
FCA action. This minimum harm requirement could mimic the
intended function of the Escobar materiality standard. This is not a
claim that calculating damages is easy. The key, however, is that
the court already must address the question of damages, so
attaching a minimum harm requirement does not add significant
complexity. A minimum harm requirement also gives lowers courts
and Congress room to experiment with different damages
calculations.
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Another alternative for the Supreme Court would have been to
focus on the mens rea requirement of knowledge. It could have
addressed concerns regarding trivial violations by emphasizing
proof of knowledge. Returning to Justice Thomas’s hypothetical, a
relatively remote issue such as the country of origin of a stapler may
be straightforward to prove, but it will be difficult to prove that a
person submitting the healthcare paperwork was actually aware of
the improper country of origin. Similar to damages, this is not to say
that mens rea is an easy analysis, but rather that mens rea is
already a part of the analysis required to demonstrate fraud.
Finally, even if the Court believes that a complex analysis of the
combined factors of mens rea, damages, and causation is necessary,
it could have attempted to shift that analysis to a different stage.
Rather than requiring such analysis for determination of liability,
that analysis could be applied in the calculation of sanctions.286
Shifting the uncertainty to the area of sanctions is a wellestablished tool from the criminal context, in which courts exercise
substantial discretion in establishing penalties.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court plays an essential role in balancing a variety
of important societal interests when addressing white-collar
offenses. Statutes should be, to some extent, sufficiently broad to
encompass the creative ways individuals and corporations may
obtain improper advantages, but those statutes should still provide
sufficient notice to potential defendants for reasons of both general
deterrence and fairness. Congress has often adopted relatively
broad white-collar statutes. The Supreme Court has expressed
concern about vagueness and overbreadth in those statutes, though,
and it has often narrowed the scope of liability through statutory
interpretation. These narrowing decisions can be beneficial to
potential defendants for two distinct reasons. First, they limit the
scope of liability, which is in the immediate interest of the defendant

286 See, e.g., Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1250 (1997) (noting the “extraordinarily broad discretion”
that federal judges exercise in sentencing); Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing
Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1293, 1328 (2006) (advocating for more individualized
judgments at sentencing based on what the defendant deserves).
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facing prosecution. Second, these narrowing decisions may improve
clarity, as they may facilitate a conversation among lower courts
and Congress to better specify the limits of liability.
Unfortunately, these narrowing decisions do not automatically
provide greater clarity. Some narrowing decisions require courts to
engage in complex or unclear analysis, which may increase the
potential for vagueness and uncertainty. Other narrowing decisions
incorporate an element of analysis which is highly related to other
existing elements of the offense, and these highly relational
analyses are also prone to vagueness and uncertainty. Furthermore,
the uncertainty due to the relationship with other elements also
raises the possibility that the actual scope of liability was not
reduced. Thus, beyond the basic concern that companies may have
difficulty deploying effective compliance regimes in light of vague
and uncertain laws, the Supreme Court incurs significant risks by
employing highly vague narrowing strategies. It incurs the risk that
their narrowing efforts may not actually narrow the scope of the
statutory scheme, and the resulting vagueness may impede a
productive dialectic with Congress in improving the statutory
scheme.
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